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The constitutional scheme is like an enchanted castle, which
draws each person within by the image of what he or she desires or
fears, there to wander from chamber to chamber. It offers power as a
goal for our hopes, and division of power as a remedy for our fears.1
When we contemplate a [foreign legal] system from outside it
seems like a wall of stone, every part even with all of'the others, except
so far as our own local education may lead us to see subordinations to
which we are accustomed. But to one brought up within it, varying
emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences
gained only from life, may give different parts wholly new values that
logic and grammar never could have got from books.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 9, 1987, the Political Constitution of the Republic of
Nicaragua (Constitution)3 took effect. It is the first Nicaraguan consti-
tution since the 1979 Sandinista Revolution4 (Revolution). The Frente
1. Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40 STAN. L. RMv, 181, 192 (1987).
2. Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 106 (1923) (Holmes, J.).
3. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF NICARAGUA (1987) [hereinafter NICAR. CONST,] see
App. A. The Spanish text is reprinted in 91 La Gaceta (Nicar.) 33 (1987). The translation of
the final Constitution was provided by the Nicaraguan Mission to the United Nations in New
York. A slightly different English translation and a photocopy of the Spanish text are re-
printed in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Franz eds.
Sept. 1987) [hereinafter WORLD CONST.].
4. The Sandinista Revolution overthrew the dynasty of the Somoza family in Nicaragua
in 1979. Somoza had been put into power by the United States Marines in 1933 following
almost a third of a century of United States occupation. By the time of the Revolution, the
Somoza family controlled much of the wealth of the country, including 25% of all of the
arable land, the 26 largest industrial companies, and interests in 120 corporations. They
owned the eight largest sugar cane plantations and several refineries so that they were the
largest producers of sugar. They had monopoly control over the production of alcohol and
pasteurized milk. They held partial control of bananas, meat, salt. and vegetable oils. They
were the representatives of Mercedes-Benz and other car dealers in Nicaragua. They owned
the national airline, the shipping companies, and had a major share in the textile and cement
industries. A. RouQulE, THE MILITARY AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 153-56 (1987).
That wealth, combined with other investments inside Nicaragua, made the Somoza fortune
worth between $300 and $600 million at the time of the Revolution. C. VILTAS, THE
SANDINISTA REVOLUTION 50 (1985).
At the same time, the people of Nicaragua were among the poorest in the world, and less
than 1% of the population graduated from primary school. The disparity between the riches
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Sandinista Liberacion Nacional (FSLN or Sandinista party), which led
the Revolution, tried to use the constitution-making process as a way of
consolidating and legitimating its power within Nicaragua. The Consti-
tution has been a major stumbling block in the peace talks between the
Contras' and the Sandinistas.6 In the United States, government officials
have commented on the failure of the Nicaraguan Constitution to estab-
lish western-style democracy in Nicaragua.7 Despite this commentary
about the Nicaraguan Constitution, there has been very little analysis of
its contents.' In this Article I undertake a detailed examination of the
text of the Nicaraguan Constitution to expose the tensions in the text
between limiting the power and legitimating the power of the FSLN, and
between writing a constitution and having a revolution.9
of the Somozas and the rest of the country, as well as the Somoza's notoriously repressive and
corrupt Government, enabled the FSLN to create a broad coalition of Nicaraguans to over-
throw the Somozas. In fact, even the Carter Administration gave Nicaragua S39 million in
emergency food aid after the Revolution. REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMIbTEES
INVESTIGATING THE IAN CONTRA AFFAIR 37 (. Brinkley & S. Engelberg eds. 1988) [here-
inafter IRAN CONTRA REPORT]. Between 1979 and 1981 the United States gave Nicaragua
approximately $117 million in aid. Report of The National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America ("The Kissinger Commission"), reprinted in NICARAGUA - UNFINISHED REVOLU-
TION: THE NEw NICARAGUA READER 14, 15 (P. Rosset & J. Vandermeer eds. 1986) [herein-
after NEw NICARAGUA READER]. For the past nine years the FSLN has governed
Nicaragua.
5. Contras (short for counter-revolutionaries) comprise military and political opposition
forces in Nicaragua. See eg., United Nicaragua Opposition, Principles and Objectives for a
Provisional Government of National Reconciliation, reprinted in WORLD CONsT., supra note 3.
6. See e.. L.A. Times, May 27, 1988, at 6, col. 3 (Contras call for rewriting of Consti-
tution in order to sign peace treaty); Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1987, at A46, col. 1.
7. Abrams, A Constitution Bows to Repression, L.A. Times, Jan. 26, 1987, § II at 72, col
3.
8. For example, the most comprehensive and intelligent examination of the Sandinistas
completely dismisses the importance of the Constitution and dismisses it in one paragraph. D.
GILBERT, SANDINISTAS: THE PARTY AND T=E REVOLUTION 78 (1988) ('The new constitu-
tional order, officially inaugurated in January 1987, lies wholly outside the Sandinista system
of power. The western-style constitution does not address the vanguard status of the party,
nor does it recognize the popular democracy the Sandinistas hoped to create in the mass
organizations....").
9. The word "text" has become quite fashionable in United States constitutional theory.
See, eg., Perry, The Authority of the Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551 (1985) (part of a two volume interpretation sympo-
sium). "Text" has also been used in many different ways. I use "text" in the broad sense used
by Stanley Fish and Richard Rorty. S. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 43 (1980)
("Interpretation is not the art of construing but the art of constructing. Interpreters do not
decode poems, they make them."); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 132 (1982)
(Nineteenth Century Idealism and Twentieth Century Textualism). These authors emphasize
the incompleteness of any text or any reading of any text and they stress the contingent nature
of any reading because of the importance of what any individual reader can bring to bear on a
text. I thus obviously do not use text in the sense of an originalist or textualist who under-
stands a single correct interpretation of a text discoverable through an examination of the
1988]
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I focus on the structures and norms established by the Constitution.
In part, this focus is purely practical because there has been little time for
a constitutional practice to develop in Nicaragua. But it also stems from
a belief that an examination of the text can reveal political and philo-
sophical tensions that the practice of constitutionalism obscures. In the
Constitution, the Sandinistas define their vision of the country and hence
define themselves and their power. But this vision is tempered by the
internal and external criticism they have received and by the practical
necessity to create a workable structure of government.
A. A Constitution as a Self-defining/Legitimating/Limiting Text
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be neces-
sary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal con-
trols on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in
the next place oblige it to control itself.
-James Madison 0
language of the document. See, eg., Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Forward The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARv L. Rv. 1, 51 (1979) ("The rightful place of the courts [is] to
articulate and elaborate the true meaning of those values. The task is discovering the meaning
of constitutional values such as equality, liberty, due process, or property .... ") (emphasis
added). In literary theory extremely broad notions of text have been implemented. See, e.g.,
R. BARTHES, IMAGE-MUSIc-TExT 156-60 (1977):
The difference is this: the work is a fragment of substance, occupying a part of the
space of books (in a library for example), the Text is a methodological field....
[Tihe work can be seen (in bookshops, in catalogues, in exam syllabuses), the text is a
process of demonstration... the work can be held in the hand, the text is held in
language, only exists in the moment of a discourse....
[T]he Text is that which goes to the limits of the rules of enunciation.... [T]hc
Text tries to place itself very exactly behind the limit of the doxa (is not general
opinion-constitutive of our democratic societies and powerfully aided by mass com-
munications-defined by its limits, the energy with which it excludes, its censorship?)
Taking the word literally, it may be said that the Text is always paradoxical...
The Text is plural. Which is not simply to say it has several meanings, but that
it accomplishes the very plural of meaning: an irreducible (and not merely an accept-
able) plural. The Text is not a coexistence of meanings but a passage, an overcros-
sing.... The plural of the Text depends, that is, not on the ambiguity of its contents
but on what might be called the stereographic plurality of its weave of signifiers (ety.
mologically, the text is a tissue, a woven fabric). The reader of the Text may be
compared to someone at a loose end.... [The Marxist interpretation of works, so
far resolutely monistic, will be able to materialize itself more by pluralizing itself (if,
however, the Marxist 'institutions' allow it.).
10. THE FEDERAIUST, No. 51, at 202 (J. Madison), reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF THE
[Vol. 12
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A constitution is a limitation on government power, an agreement
by the governed that the actions of the government exist within certain
predetermined boundaries. 1 ' A constitution also legitimates political
power within those boundaries so that the boundaries become the con-
tested territory of political power. It is precisely the struggle to define
these boundaries that makes for textual/political possibilities. It is the
tension between legitimating political power and limiting it that makes
constitutions, and the Nicaraguan Constitution in particular, a continu-
ally fruitful text for exploration. The tension between legitimation and
limitation lies at the center of this Article's examination of the Nicara-
guan Constitution.
A constitution also manifests a state's experience and aspirations.
Constitution-making remains the preeminent (and institutionalized) con-
stituting act of a country. It serves as a marker and re-writing of where
the state has been, and expresses where it would like to be going. In its
purest sense, a constitution self-defines a state. It may be seen as the
essential political act. The conflicts between the limiting/legitimating
and the self-defining/re-writing/aspiring aspects of a constitutional text
create discontinuities and contradictions noticeable to any reader.
A constitution marks the intersection of continuity and discontinu-
ity of the political consciousness of a state. It reflects on, and must be
read against a background of all past constitutions, and particularly all
past constitutions of that country, its immediate pretexts. Although
written constitutions developed within western European liberalism, con-
stitutions now run the ideological gamut, from the Swaziland Constitu-
tion that incorporates the traditional tribal ruler in the Constitution,"2 to
the Soviet Constitution that (apparently) has little similarity to the actual
political practice of that country and is easily changed to accommodate
the immediacy of various political "reasons." The new Nicaraguan Con-
stitution marks the difficult constitutional transition from a dictatorship
to a more democratic form of government.
Generally, constitutional texts try to convey an impression of cohe-
siveness and textual unity. These attempts, such as incorporating a
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY v. Kammen ed. 1986).
11. The classic definition of a constitution is "an institutionalized system of effective regu-
larized restraints on government action." C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND DEMOCRACY 125 (4th ed. 1968) (Friedrich's definition was considered modem because it
recognized that constitutions could take many forms (written, unwritten) and that institutions
not included in the text of the constitution could still play a role in the constitutional structure
(e.g., the press). However this definition is unduly narrow because it focuses on the limiting
aspects of the constitution.).
12. SWAZILAND CONST. chap. IV (1968).
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stated constitutional purpose and imparting a sense of societal cohesive-
ness, intentionally obscure tensions and contradictions within the society.
In order to unify the country the text must at least appear to accommo-
date all of the different constituents. Careful analysis of the constitu-
tional text uncovers tensions and contradictions that are hidden within
the text, as well as gaps left by conflicts so great that they could not be
hidden and therefore have been omitted.
B. The United States Constitution as Ur-Text
The United States Constitution is the oldest existing written consti-
tution; it is the most explicated and analyzed of all written constitutions.
It is the text used as the basis for many subsequent constitutions around
the world. A United States-trained lawyer will tend to regard the United
States Constitution as the Ur-text of all Constitutions, and this Article
reflects this inevitable bias. Using the United States Constitution as a foil
in my examination need not prevent careful analysis; rather it introduces
an implicit analysis of the United States Constitution in light of current
constitutional thinking around the world. In addition to shedding light
on the particularities of the Nicaraguan Constitution, this Article pro-
vides a new context in which to view the United States Constitution and
to expose some of its discontinuities and fissures, as well as its age.
This Article begins by examining the historical context of the Nica-
raguan Constitution and briefly outlining the structure of the Constitu-
tion. After that general introduction the Article focuses on the
resolution, in the constitutional text, of two categories of tensions: self-
definitional tensions and legitimational/limitational tensions. Section III
illustrates the constitutional drafters' attempts to address three unique
historic problems of Nicaragua in the constitutional text. In doing so,
the drafters define the new regime in relation to the past and in response
to current critics of the Sandinistas. The first two problems, the role of
the church in Nicaraguan society and the protection of the indigenous
peoples in Nicaragua, have been widely discussed in the international
legal community as human rights issues. The third is the response to the
history of continual foreign intervention in Nicaragua. In responding to
all three of these issues, the drafters were forced to write for and try to
influence audiences other than the people of Nicaragua, such as interna-
tional human rights commissions and foreign governments that have crit-
icized the Sandinistas.13 For example, the passages of the Nicaraguan
13. Cranhan, Political Legitimacy and Dissent, in CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA: A MUL-
TIDIMENSIONAL READER 101 n.9 (J. Valenta & E. Duran eds. 1987) (hereinafter CONFLICT IN
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Constitution that deal with foreign intervention are clearly meant to be
read by, and even influence the actions of, the United States
Government.
Section IV examines the tension created when a revolutionary party
attempts to institutionalize itself in a constitution. In Nicaragua, the
FSLN has been confronted with the political problem of maintaining
power and ideological control while still creating a constitutional rather
than an arbitrary government. This Article examines the role of the
FSLN in the constitutional text, in particular the ability of the party to
exercise power without official constitutional status. It then examines the
ability of the judiciary to counteract the political power of the party.
Finally, Section V examines the conflict between the institutionalization
of the Revolution in the Constitution and the idea of constitutionalism.
The Nicaraguan Constitution is a "revolutionary" constitution because
the Constitution's stated purpose is to "protect and preserve the achieve-
ments of the revolution."' 4 Many of the political tensions found in the
Constitution stem from the inherent conflict between a revolution, which
over throws political power, and a constitution, which institutionalizes it.
This Article concentrates on the text of the Nicaraguan Constitution
and not the process of constitutionalism in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan
Constitution is the document attached as Appendix A to this Article,
while constitutionalism is the practice of limiting government through a
constitution. There is more to the practice of constitutionalism than the
constitutional text; but the text is the manifestation and cultural artifact
of the practice. The text is the starting point for the practice of constitu-
tionalism. An examination of constitutionalism in Nicaragua would ex-
amine the implementation of the Constitution by evaluating the
structures created by the Constitution and the process used to implement
it. Such an inquiry would be whether the Constitution provides a true
limitation on governmental action.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze completely the Nica-
raguan Government or situation. Rather, this Article considers the Nic-
araguan Constitution as a text, a set of self-defining political statements,
a cultural artifact, and as a fascinating and self-limiting example of that
peculiar project known as a revolutionary constitution. Out of these con-
siderations stem insights into Nicaragua, the United States Constitution,
and the process of "constitutional politics."
NICARAGUA] (listing international organizations' reports on the status of human rights in
Nicaragua.).
14. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, invocation (the Constitution is also proclaimed "For
The Homeland, For the Revolution, For the Unity of the Nation and For Peace.").
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II. THE NICARAGUAN CONSTITUTION
It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to
plan, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than
the creation of a new system. For the initiator has the enmity of all
who would profit by the preservation of the old institutions and merely
lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the new ones. The
hesitation of the latter arises in part from the fear of their adversaries,
who have the laws on their side, and in part from the general skepti-
cism of mankind which does not really believe in an innovation until
experience proves its value. So it happens that whenever his enemies
have occasion to attack the innovator they do so with the passion of
partisans while the others defend him sluggishly so that the innovator
and his party are alike vulnerable.
-Niccolo Machiavelli
5
A. The Legal and Constitutional Context
Nicaragua has had a long history of at least formal constitutional
rule. There have been at least eleven constitutions in its history.1 6 The
first was a colonial constitution imposed by the Spanish in 1809. It was
followed by a series of constitutions imposed by foreign powers. 17 The
first indigenous constitution was written in the early years of this century
under President Zelya.1 s It was abolished by United States Marines fol-
lowing a call from the Constitutional Assembly to replace President
Diaz. 9 The Somoza Constitution, in effect at the time of the 1979
Revolution, was adopted in 1974.20 The Somoza Constitution was ex-
tremely repressive. It limited basic civil liberties such as freedom of
speech and assembly, and placed most political power with the
President.2 1
Immediately after the Revolution the Sandinistas abolished the
15. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 15 (T.G. Bergin ed. 1947, Original Italian ed. 1532).
16. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1987, at 2, col. 1; see also WORLD CONST., supra note 3, Chro-
nology (Nicar.).
17. Nicaragua has been occupied or controlled by Spain, England, and the United States.
18. Id.
19. The United States Marines occupied Nicaragua for almost idl of the first third of the
20th Century. CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA, supra note 13, at 65-66.
20. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA (1974), 89 La Gaceta April 24,
1974, reprinted in WORLD CONST., supra note 3 [hereinafter NICAR. CONST. 1974] see supra
note 4, for a discussion of the Samozas.
21. Id art. 189. The powers of the President in the 1974 Constitution were enumerated in
five typed pages including such powers as "authority... over matters... of internal order and
external security." Id.
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Somoza Constitution z2 and its political structure.23 Until a new constitu-
tion could be drafted, the Government of National Reconstruction issued
the Fundamental Statute,24 which created a governmental structure in-
cluding a ruling Junta," Council of State,26 and Courts of Justice.2 7
Shortly thereafter, the Junta issued the Rights and Guarantees of the Nic-
araguan People,28 which protected the individual, social, and political
rights of the people. These two statutes operated as the constitutional
structure of the country until the new Constitution was approved. Elec-
tions were held on November 14, 1984, for President, Vice President, and
members of the National Assembly.29 On January 9, 1985, the Presi-
dent, Vice President, and National Assembly replaced the Junta and the
Council of State as the leaders of the country.
The first duty of the National Assembly was to draft a new constitu-
tion.3" The National Assembly began its consideration of the constitu-
tion by appointing a special constitutional drafting commission31
composed of individuals representing seven different political parties
based on each party's percentage of membership in the National Assem-
bly.32 The Commission began by soliciting proposals from the various
political parties in Nicaragua.33  The Assembly wrote a preliminary
22. ESTATuTo FuNDAmENTAL art. 3, 1 La Gaceta, July 20, 1979 (abolishing old Consti-
tution), reprinted in CONSEJO DE EsTADO, PRINCIPALES LEYES APROBADAS POR EL
GonmRNo DE RECONSTRUCCION NACIONAL 1979-83 [hereinafter PRINIciPALES LEYES
APROBADAS]. There are no official copies of the Nicaraguan laws in English. All translations
of the laws are by the author. There are not, as far as can be determined, official Nicaraguan
case reporters in either English or Spanish. The Harvard University International Law Li-
brary has a Spanish language collection of all of the Nicaraguan laws since the Revolution.
23. Id. art. 4.
24. Id
25. Id art 4. The five-person junta was named by the FSLN and was composed of a broad
range of people including Violeta Barrios de Chamomo, widow of the murdered editor of La
Prensa, industrialist Alfonso Roberto, and Daniel Ortega.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Estatuto Sombre Derechosy Garantias de los Nicaraguenses. Decree No. 52 (Aug. 21,
1979), reprinted in WORLD CONST., supra note 3 (March 1982 Supplement).
29. NICARAGUA: A REVOLUTION UNDER SIEGE 239 (R. Harris & C. Vilas eds. 1985)
[hereinafter REVOLUTION UNDER SIEGE].
30. Id at 241.
31. Id.
32. Instituto Historico Centro-Americano, Toward a New Constitution, reprinted in NEv
NICARAGUA READER, supra note 4, at 359.
33. See, eg., Constitutional Proposals of the FSLN (issued Sept. 8, 1985), reprinted in
International Press, Dec. 30, 1985, at 809. An analysis of the proposals of the various political
parties can be found in Instituto Historico Centro-Americano, Toward a New Constitution,
reprinted in, NEw NICARAGUA READER, supra note 4, at 360-63.
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draft of the Constitution34 (First Draft), which consisted of 221 articles
and was considerably longer than subsequent draftls. 35 The First Draft
was circulated throughout the country and the international legal com-
munity. A series of approximately seventy-five open forums (Cabildos
Abiertos) were held throughout Nicaragua so that Nicaraguan citizens
could comment on the Constitution.3' The Commission issued a second
draft (Second Draft) of the Constitution in response to the comments
that it received on the First Draft.37 The National Assembly debated the
Second Draft on the floor of the Constitutional Convention, and adopted
it, with some changes, as the Constitution of Nicaragua in November
1987. The Constitution went into effect on January 9, 1987. 3
B. An Overview39
The Nicaraguan Constitution is divided into a Preamble and eleven
Titles," each divided into Chapters, which are in turn composed of 202
Articles.4 1 The Preamble begins with a statement that the Constitution is
proclaimed by the people through their representatives, the National As-
sembly. The Preamble invokes past revolutionary struggles against
United States intervention and the previous dictators of Nicaragua, spe-
cifically the revolutionary struggles of Augusto C. Sandino42 and Carlos
Fonseca.43 The Constitution is dedicated "to the generations of heroes
34. Draft of the Constitution of Nicaragua submitted to the National Assembly on Fcbru-
ary 21, 1986 [hereinafter First Draft, Nicar. Const.), reprinted in CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA,
supra note 13, app. c.
35. Id.
36. Speech of Carlos Nuiiez, President of the Nicaraguan National Assembly (March 13,
1987) (transcribed by the BBC and available on NEXIS). See L.A. Times, Jan. 9, 1987, at 12,
col. 1. In addition to the comments received in Nicaragua, the drafters solicited comments
from legal scholars. A conference was held in New York so that United States lawyers could
comment on the text. N.Y. Times, April 25, 1986, at A4, col. 1.
37. Draft of September 5, 1985 [hereinafter Second Draft, Nicar. Const.] (This is an unof-
ficial translation.).
38. L.A. Times, Jan. 9, 1987, at 12, col. 11. Stern, A New Constitution for Nicaragua,
NAT'L L.., Jan. 19, 1987, at 13.
39. For a short description of the Nicaraguan Constitution, without analysis, see generally
Note, Nicaraguan Constitution, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 547 (1987).
40. See generally NICAR. CONST., supra note 3.
41. Id.
42. Augusto C sarSandino (1895-1934) led the uprising of Nicaraguans against the occu.
pation of Nicaragua by the United States Marines beginning in 1926. Sandino was assassi-
nated with at least the tacit approval of the Marines, after a meeting with the new United
States-supported President of Nicaragua in 1934. He is considered a national hero and martyr
and is the inspiration and namesake for the FSLN. See generally G. SELSOR, SANDINO (1981);
N. MACCAULAY, THE SANDINO AFFAIR (1967).
43. Carlos Fonseca, a founder of the FSLN and its leading thinker, was killed during the
Revolution.
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and martyrs who forged and carried forward the liberation struggle for
national independence."'  Finally the Preamble establishes the Constitu-
tion as the legal framework to protect and preserve the Revolution.45
Title I of the Constitution is an explicit statement of the fundamen-
tal principles of the country: independence," democracy,47 peace and a
just world order,4' political pluralism, mixed economy, and non-
alignment.49
The state ("independent, free, sovereign, unitary and indivisible" °)
and the form of government ("a participatory and representative demo-
cratic republic." 51), along with other attributes of the state52 are defined
in Title II. Title I defines Nicaraguan nationality.53
Title IV contains a catalogue of individual,' political, 5 social, 6
family,5 7 and labor rights 8 of Nicaraguans, as well as separate descrip-
44. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, invocation, para. 7. In the Second Draft the spirit of
the Party was directly invoked. Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37, preamble, pam. 1
("To the generations of the heroes and martyrs who, in the mountains and underground,
forged the Sandinista Front for National Liberation, the conductor and guide of the victory.").
45. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, preamble.
46. Id. art. 1 ("Independence, sovereignty and self-determination are inalienable rights of
the Nicaraguan people and the foundation of the Nicaraguan nation.").
47. Id. art. 2 ("National sovereignty rests with the people, the source of all power and
forgers of their own destiny. The people exercise democracy by freely deciding upon and
participating in the construction of the economic, political and social system which best serves
their interests." ).
48. Id. art. 3 ("The struggle for peace and the establishment of a just world order are
unrenounceable national commitments...
49. Id. art. 5.
50. Id. art. 6.
51. Id. art. 7.
52. Id. arts. 10 (national territory), 11 (language), 12 (capital city), 13 (patriotic symbols),
and 14 (religion).
53. Id. arts. 15-22. The United States Constitution did not define citizens until after the
Civil War. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. .. ."). See also Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) which held that a freed slave could not be a
"citizen" and which precipitated the United States Civil War.
54. NicAR. CoNsr., supra note 3, arts. 23-46. The right to amparo (art. 28) is conve-
niently glossed in the official English translation. The gloss, which compares amparo to habeas
corpus, fails to mention that in Mexico, where there is no judicial review, amparo allows indi-
viduals to appeal convictions, (but the decisions have no precedential value) and acts as a
substitute for judicial review. Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV.
891, 904-07 (1988).
55. Id. arts. 47-55.
56. Id. arts. 56-69.
57. Id. arts. 70-79. There is a tension in the family law provisions between the state pro-
tecting the family and the state protecting equal rights. Furthermore, it is not clear how equal
rights can exist with the extensive protections of the "process of human reproduction" as
provided in the Constitution. See generally Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study In
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tion of the rights of the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic Coast. 9 The
Constitution includes the standard collection of western "negative" 60
rights, as well as freedom of conscience,61 equality, 6 and certain minimal
standards of criminal procedure.6" These rights are supplemented by the
incorporation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international human rights agreements in article 46 of the Constitution.
Constitutional provisions also guarantee positive rights such as a
right to shelter and food."4 The social rights include the right to work
(art. 57), right to education and culture (art. 58), the right of physical
education, relaxation and recreation (art. 65), and the right to accurate
information (art. 66). In establishing the right to work, the drafters also
clearly state their orthodox Marxist belief that -work is required by
human nature.6 The right to accurate information (which possibly de-
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. Rv. 1497 (1983)(examining and critiquing similar
ideas in United States law). The language makes clear that the state does not protect mar-
riages or defacto unions between homosexuals.
58. Id. arts. 80-88.
59. Id. arts. 89-91.
60. "Negative" rights refer to an entitlement not to be prevented from something (e.g., the
government cannot prohibit free speech) rather than a positive right to something (e.g., a right
to a job or food). Although it is commonly used in constitutional theory, the distinction Is
meaningless. See generally H. SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS (1982) on the fallacy of this distinction,
61. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 29.
62. Id. art. 48.
63. Id. arts. 33-39. It remains to be seen how these rights will be enforced. For example,
Article 34(4) guarantees the right to a defense from the start of criminal proceedings. In a
recent case involving opposition leaders, a judge denied the leaders legal counsel in their initial
interviews with the judge and the police because that questioning was prior to the start of
official proceedings. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1988, at 3, col. 1. Similarly, while Article 34(1)
creates a presumption of innocence, certain recent laws seem to remove that presumption. See
Presidential Decree No. 312 (issued Feb. 20, 1988) ("Illegal possesion of foreign currency is
presumed in the cases in which its legitimate acquisition cannot be proven.").
64. An extensive list of human rights reports on Nicaragua, in addition to the yearly
reports, can be found in CoNFLIcr IN NICARAGUA, supra note 13, at 101 n.9. NICAR, CONST.,
supra note 3, art. 46. The long list of individual, social, labor, and family rights in the Consti-
tution, although interesting, is not unique to the Nicaraguan situation. Unlike rights an-
nounced in other developing countries, these rights are comprehensive and are included in the
body of the Constitution. Cf. CoNSTrUTION OF TANZANIA (rights in preamble rather than
body of Constitution). The human rights provisions seem to be judicially enforceable. See, e.g.,
LAWYERS COMMITrEE REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, NICARAGUA: REVO-
LUTIONARY JUSTICE-A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, at 25, 31
(1985) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMrrrEE REPORT]. The major problem with human rights
in Nicaragua, in addition to the rights of the indigenous peoples, has been the suspension of
rights due to the state of emergency. Decree No. 996 (March 15, 1982). The state of emer-
gency was amended on July 19, 1984, by Decree No. 1477 to allow assemblies and demonstra-
tions for the elections.
65. Cf. K. MARX, GERMAN IDEOLOGY 149-51, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER (R. Tucker ed. 1978) (discussing work and production as basis of human nature),
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rives from the demand of non-aligned countries for a New World Infor-
mation Order) is countered by a right to provide information that is
limited by the Constitution and subject to retroactive liability." Many of
the human rights provisions can be suspended by the President during
national emergencies.67
A careful reading of the Constitution reveals that many of these
rights, while granted in broad language, are limited to situations "permit-
ted by law." For example, a close reading of article 44 reveals that the
article does not provide a meaningful, unlimited "right" to personal
66. Cf Alien and Sedition Acts of 1789, 1 Stat. 596; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I wholly disagree with the argument of the Govern-
ment that the First Amendment left the common law of seditious libel in force... .'); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-77 (1964) (discussing how the Sedition Act of 1789
has been assumed to be unconstitutional).
67. NICAR. CONsT., supra note 3, arts. 185-86. When the Constitution became effective in
January 1987, President Ortega immediately took advantage of the emergency provisions.
Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1987, at A13, col. 3.
Nicaragua was under a state of emergency for most of 1982-87. The emergency decree
was lifted in January 1988, after the Contadora Agreement and recent peace talks. The history
of the State of Emergency in Nicaragua has been traced fully in a recent Note
Many of the rights suspended in March 1982 were restored shortly before the 1984
national elections. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1985, at Al, col. 3. The state of emergency
was renewed and strengthened in October 1985, suspending, inter alia, the rights of
free expression, public assembly, and privacy of mail and of the home. Id. The state
of emergency was due to expire when the Constitution took effect on January 9,
1987, but President Ortega signed a decree on that day which suspended various
constitutional guarantees, including habeas corpus in cases involving national secur-
ity and rights of free expression, assembly and movement. Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1987,
at A13, col. 4. On February 23, 1987, the state of emergency was extended for an-
other year by the National Assembly. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1987, at A3, col 2. The
rights suspended include the right to strike, the right to publish uncensored news and
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Id. Since the state of emer-
gency was imposed initially, hundreds of Nicaraguans have been jailed for violating
security laws. Id. Apr. 5, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
Nicaraguan Constitution, supra note 39, at 548 n.9 (1987).
The Constitution permits the suspension of most rights in the event of a state of emer-
gency. NIcAR. CONST. supra note 3, art. 185. Article 186 lists the rights that cannot be sus-
pended.
Although state of emergency provisions can be extremely repressive, many other constitu-
tions have them, including the United States Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl.
2 ("The ... writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
The state of emergency in Nicaragua was lifted in the spring of 1988 as part of the peace
process. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1988, at 1, col. 6 (suspending state of emergency). Nicaragua
Presidential Decrees Repeal Laws on Tribunals and Lift State of Emergency, British Broadcast-
ing Corp., Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 21, 1988, at ME/0054/d/. (translations of
original texts) (Presidential Decree No. 297) [hereinafter Nicar. Presidential Decrees].
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
property.68 Rather, the Legislature decides which property, or other
rights, it is essential to protect. Furthermore, the rights of Nicaraguans
are explicitly "limited by the rights of others, the collective security and
the just requirement of the common good." 69 The Constitution leaves
the definition and scope of some of these "rights" completely to the dis-
cretion of future lawmakers with no apparent opportunity for judicial
redress.7 °
Title V discusses national defense. It establishes the "duty and right
of Nicaraguans . . . [to] defen[d] . . . life, Homeland, justice, and
peace.... 1,71 Nicaraguans also have the right to defend "sovereignty,
independence, and revolutionary gains."172 To this end, the Constitution
establishes the Sandinista Popular Army as the national army of
Nicaragua.73
Title VI of the Constitution contains chapters on the National Econ-
omy,74 Agrarian Reform, 75 and Public Finances.76 The provisions re-
garding national economy establish the goal of the economic system, 77
and the types of property ownership allowed in the country. 78 The Con-
stitution also obligates the state to regulate distribution of consumer
68. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 44. ("Nicaraguans have the right to the personal
property and necessary goods that are essential for the integral development of each person.").
69. Id. art. 24.
70. See, eg., id. art. 54. ( "The right to public assembly ... in conformity with the law Is
recognized.").
71. Id. art. 92. The fact that there is an explicit correlative duty makes this very different
from the United States Constitution, which contains no duties.
72. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 93.
73. Id. art. 95. See infra notes 218-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Army.
74. Id. arts. 98-105.
75. Id. arts. 106-11.
76. Id. arts. 112-15. (Such provisions have become common in Third World constitu-
tions). See generally FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF CUBA (Constitution) arts. 16-17 (1959) (na-
tional economy) and arts. 20-21 (agrarian reform provision) in WORLD CoNsT., supra note 3;
CONST. OF KENYA arts. 99-105 (1979) (public finance) in WORLD CONST., supra note 3.
77. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, arts. 98-105. Article 98 states that "[t]he principal
function of the state is to promote the country's material development, overcome the inherited
backwardness and dependence of the economy, improve the standard of living and create a
more just distribution of wealth." The Second Draft, seemed to give the Government more
power because "[t]he State can intervene in the national economy in order to guarantee the
defense of the interests of the majority of the people and direct the economy toward national
objectives." Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37, art. 95. It is unclear whether the state
still has that power but one may assume that the state can make laws that implement the goals
of the Constitution.
78. NIcAR. CoNsT., supra note 3, arts. 103-04. Article 103 guarantees the existence of
public, private, cooperative, associative, and communal property. Article 104 guarantees
equality before law of all forms of ownership.
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goods.79
The agrarian reform"0 provisions establish the regulation and own-
ership8 1 of property and the means by which the reform shall be carried
out. Agrarian reform was one of the initial goals of the FSLN, 2 and
continues to be one of the central programs of the Revolution. Accord-
ing to the Constitution, agrarian reform is "the fundamental instrument
for achieving a just distribution of land and an effective means for revolu-
tionary transformation, national development and the social progress of
Nicaragua. '" 8 3 The reforms consist of two major processes: the expropri-
ation and redistribution of the extensive holdings of the Somoza family
and reorganization of the farming sector to increase productivity by cre-
ating cooperative and state-run collective farms and imposing penalties,
including expropriation, upon farms with low productivity."M One
method of reform includes state promotion of the voluntary association
of peasants in cooperatives.8 5 Interestingly, there is no provision for just
compensation for property taken by the Government,86 facilitating the
Government's ability to institute land reform through land
redistribution.
A number of provisions in the Constitution attempt to prevent the
endemic corruption that has plagued other Latin American governments.
The chapter on public finances requires an annual balanced budget and
the creation of a tax system. 7 The office of the Controller General of the
Republic, 8 was established to create "a system which controls the
proper use and prevents abuse of funds."8 9 Furthermore, the Constitu-
tion requires that all state officials disclose their financial status upon
entering and leaving public service.' Members of the National Assem-
bly are also explicitly prohibited from using their positions to benefit pri-
79. Id. art. 105.
80. Id. arts. 106-11.
81. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 108. These articles abolish inefficient forms of land
ownership and exploitation of peasants and guarantee land "to all land owners who produc-
tively and efficiently work it."
82. See Historic Program of the FSLN, reprinted in SANDIISTAS SPEAK 13, 15-16 (B.
Marcus, ed. 1982) [hereinafter SANDi~sTAs SPEAK].
83. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 106.
84. D. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 86-87.
85. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 109.
86. But see U.S. CONsT. amend. V (prohibiting taking property without just compensa-
tion). The lack of a takings provision was not an oversight because such a prohibition would
inhibit, or at least slow down, land reform.
87. NIcAR. CONSr., supra note 3, arts. 112-15.
88. Id. arts. 154-57.
89. Id. art. 155, para. 1.
90. Id art. 130.
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vate businesses.91
Title VII gives the State, and thus the party iii power, control over
all aspects of the Nicaraguan educational 92 and cultural system.93 The
educational system's goal is to "giv[e] [Nicaraguans a] scientific and hu-
manist way of thinking ... [and training so that they are capable of
carrying out the] common interest necessary for the progress of the na-
tion."94 The Constitution defines education as "a single, democratic, cre-
ative, and participatory process, which promotes scientific research and
links theory with practice.... It is based on... national values; on the
knowledge of our history and reality .... ,9 Education is specifically
aimed at creating a "new" Nicaraguan and forms part of the transforma-
tive project of the Constitution. Article 117 states that education should
involve studying the Constitution, which cultivates and incorporates
Sandinista values and history. In the First Draft, "education" specifi-
cally included teaching children about the Revolution. 96 The Constitu-
tion no longer requires that the people be taught about the Revolution,
but the Revolution remains an important part of education, particularly
as part of the required military service.97
The most interesting aspect of the Title on education is its emphasis
on the transformative quality of education. 98 The Constitution states
that "education is fundamental to the transformation and development
91. Id art. 135.
92. Id. art. 119 ("Education is an unrenounceable responsibility of the state, including
planning, direction and organization.").
93. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, arts. 116-28. Education has been a central part of the
FSLN program. After the Revolution, the FSLN organized a massive literacy campaign that,
for the first time, taught the majority of Nicaraguans to read and write. See generally S. HIR-
SHON & 3. BUTLER, AND TEACH THE PEOPLE TO READ: THE NICARAGUAN LITERACY CAM-
PAIGN (1983).
94. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 116.
95. Id. art. 117.
96. First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, art. 123. Artile 123 of the First Draft
would have allowed the FSLN to educate the youth and the Army to respect the Revolution
and its leaders.
97. D. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 63 (discussing Sandinista attempts to indoctrinate re-
cruits). See infra § IV A(1) for a discussion of the "political" nature of the Army.
98. Sandinista education theory is based on the work of Paulo Ireire, the Brazilian educa.
tional theorist. Freire was a consultant to the Nicaraguan Government during the literacy
crusade. G. BLACK, TRIUMPH OF THE PEOPLE 314 (1981). Freire's theories rely on a notion
of evolving social and individual life and development based on learning about linguistic con-
cepts. Part of the transformation occurs through greater awareness of social circumstances.
More particularly, it is based on the social rather than purely individual benefits of education.
Education is seen as transforming both the individual and society. Vee P. FREIRE, PEDAGOOY
OF THE OPPRESSED (1981).
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of the individual and society."99 This assumption about the transforma-
tive power of education underscores a theme of the Constitution: the
development and transformation of individual Nicaraguans occurs
through an understanding of the Constitution's text and participation in
the political process." °° The goal of transformation is incorporated into
other passages in the Constitution. For example, the fundamental objec-
tive of the Penitentiary System is "to transform the detainee."'0 1 The
goal of transformation reflects the progressive, or forward-looking,
stance of the Constitution. Rather than maintaining or preserving the
country as it is, the Constitution contemplates future progress."°2 It is
appropriate that the Constitution opens with a dedication to those who
"preserve the future happiness of Nicaraguans."' 03
Transformation is also supported in the other central metaphor of
the Constitution: the state as "instrument" of change."m The state is an
active participant in the transformation of Nicaragua. It ensures mate-
rial and spiritual progress. Similarly, the state's implementation of the
agrarian reform "is the fundamental instrument for achieving a just dis-
tribution of land and an effective means for revolutionary
transformation."' 05
Title VIII of the Constitution deals with the structure of govern-
ment. The government is divided into four branches: Executive (Presi-
dent), Legislative (National Assembly), Judicial, and Electoral.1°6 The
branches function independently, v but also subject to "the overriding
national interest and to the provisions established in the Constitution."108
Article 129 requires the branches to "coordinate harmoniously." 09 The
goal of harmony runs counter to the adversarial notion of "checks and
balances" and separation of powers that supposedly exists between the
three branches of the United States government. Necessarily, such coor-
99. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 116. See also i, art. 119 ("It is the duty of the state
to develop and train the technical and professional personnel at all levels ... for the develop-
ment and transformation of the Country."); art. 39 ("For Nicaragua, The Penitentiary System
is humane, its fundamental objective is to transform .....
100. See generally id. preamble.
101. Id art. 39.
102. Id art. 4 (the state shall promote material and spiritual progress).
103. Id. dedication.
104. Id.
105. Id art. 106.
106. Id. art. 7.
107. Id. art. 129. See infra notes 244-253 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
independence of the branches of the Government.
108. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 129.
109. Id.
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dination strengthens the control of the political party in power and inhib-
its internal governmental dissent. The Nicaraguan Constitution does not
suggest how this coordination is to take place.
The Constitution explicitly lists the powers of both the President
and the Legislature rather than stating them in broad inclusive provi-
sions.110 The President, elected by the people for six-year terms,"1  is
Head of State, Head of Government, and Commander in Chief of the
Defense and Security Forces." 2  The President initiates legislation, en-
acts decrees, and nominates slates of candidates for appointment to the
Supreme Court, Electoral Council, and Controller General. 113 The Con-
stitution gives the President extremely broad powers. 114 Despite calls
from opposition parties to limit the number of terms a President may
serve, the Constitution allows a President to serve an unlimited number
of terms."-
Nicaragua's Legislative body, the National Assembly, has only one
chamber, 6 and its legislative powers appear less substantial than the
powers of the President. Most of the Assembly's constitutional powers
are administrative." 7 Although there are no explicit limitations upon
the power of the National Assembly, article 138 implies that its powers
do not exceed the powers stated. 1 8 In contrast, many of the rights
granted by the Constitution depend upon legislative discretion; this dis-
cretionary power gives the Legislature more influence than that explicitly
granted.
Perhaps the most significant power of the Legislature is as "official"
110. Id. arts. 138, 150.
111. Id. art. 148.
112. Id. art. 144.
113. Id. art. 150.
114. Id. These powers include the power to assume the legislative functions of the National
Assembly during times of recess (art. 150, para. 7) and to declare a state of emergency (art.
150, para. 9). In the Second Draft the President was given more extensive powers such as the
power to "regulate the laws completely or in part, in accordance with their intent or spirit,"
and to declare war. Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37, art. 147, para. 1I (regulate),
art. 147, para. 13 (declare war).
115. This has been a major issue in the peace talks because the Contras contend that unlim-
ited terms strengthen the position of President Ortega and the Sandinista Party.
116. See generally NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, arts. 132-43.
117. Id. art. 138. The National Assembly, for example, can solicit reports, select Judges
and the Controller General, create committees, and consider national economic and social
development. One apparently important power it has is to officially "interpret the law," but
that power limits courts and not the President. The 26 explicit functions of the National
Assembly fill 2 full pages of the Constitution.
118. Id. Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (listing explicit limitations on Congress, including no
suspension of habeas corpus and no ex post facto law.).
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interpreter of the law. 1 9 In most Western countries and particularly in
the United States, the judiciary and not the legislature interprets the
law."2 In its capacity as both the writer and interpreter of law, the Nica-
raguan Legislature holds great power to interpret the laws to solve cur-
rent problems without any mediating force.
The Judicial Branch is composed of the Supreme Court and such
other courts as the National Assembly shall establish."' Similarly, the
United States Constitution only establishes the Supreme Court."
Judges serve six-year terms and may be dismissed for unspecified causes
to be determined by the National Assembly." n The failure of the Consti-
tution to state what causes shall be serious enough for the dismissal of a
Justice gives the Legislature the power to decide later, based on specific
facts. 24 This may tend to inhibit the independence of judges."
The Electoral Council is composed of judges elected by the National
Assembly to organize and oversee elections.'26 An Electoral Branch,
which operates as a type of civil service to run elections, is a popular
innovation in many Third World countries where election fraud is preva-
lent. It ensures that elections are conducted fairly. This branch imple-
ments the continuing goal of the FSLN to eliminate the corruption. 12 7
The final Titles of the Constitution concern the legal supremacy of
the Constitution 2 ' control of the Constitution, 2 9  Constitutional
Amendment, 30 and transitional matters.' 31 The transitional provisions
119. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 138, para. 2.
120. See, ag., Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). On the other hand, in
England Parliament has always been supreme.
121. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 159.
122. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 1.
123. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 162.
124. See infra § IV(B)(1) (discussing the independence of the judges).
125. See id.
126. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 168.
127. See Historic Program of the FSLN, in SANDiNisT s SPEAK, supra note 82, at 18-19.
Seesupra notes 89-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of anticorruption passages in the
Constitution.
128. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 182 (stating that "ft]he political Constitution is the
fundamental charter of the Republic; all other laws are subordinate to it.").
129. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, arts. 187-90. This deals primarily with declaring laws
unconstitutional. See infra notes 299-313 (discussing unconstitutionality).
130. Id. arts. 191-95. The Constitution allows for both partial and complete revisions of
the Constitution. It does not seem that difficult to amend the Constitution. A constitution
gains some of its strength from its permanence. Constitutions that are easily changed yield to
the whims of rulers. For example, the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1936 was amended
more than 200 times through 1977. Van Alstyne, The Idea of the Constitution as Hard Law,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 174, 181 n.26 (1987).
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provide for the continuation of pre-constitutional governmental organi-
zations until the constitutional organizations are functioning. They also
abolished all laws inconsistent with the Constitution. Finally, article 201
provides that the President, Vice President and National Assembly
elected in 1984 can remain in power until 1991.132
I. SELF-DEFINITION IN THE CONSTITUTION: THE
ATTEMPTED RESOLUTION OF THREE AREAS
OF HISTORICAL, POLITICAL
CONFLICT
The Nicaraguan Constitution, as the first constitution written under
the FSLN, is necessarily self-definitional and self'defining. The FSLN
seeks to define itself, its political views and the "new" Nicaragua. The
Constitution begins, in the Preamble, with a re-writing of the history of
Nicaragua as a history of continual struggle, and a country destined for
current and future greatness. It is not a story of occupation, domination
or tyrants; rather, it is the story of a continual struggle for liberation.
Furthermore, the re-telling valorizes the heroes of the Party and the
Party itself.
One aspect of self-definition in a constitution is how the text re-
sponds to external political criticism and reacts to history. The responses
of the Constitution to these impulses define the new country. Interna-
tional commentators have focused on three aspects of Nicaraguan life
and their "resolution" in the constitutional document will be discussed in
this section.
Discussions about Nicaragua within the United States and else-
where generally have revolved around at least three issues of concern: 1)
religion; 2) the rights of indigenous peoples; and 3) the threat of interven-
tion by the United States. The Constitution considers and attempts to
resolve each of these areas of conflict through various provisions. Unfor-
tunately, none of the resolutions prove to be as settled as they appear;
each area of conflict falls subject to tensions inherent in the Constitution.
These three areas of conflict are important when attempting to evaluate
the Nicaraguan situation because their inclusion in the Constitution is a
response to internal and external criticism of Nicaragua. In this section
each of the three areas of the Constitution is examined and considered in
light of Nicaraguan history and political necessity.
131. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, arts. 196-202.
132. Id. art. 201.
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A. Religion
History has shown us that Communist regimes inevitably seek to
either eradicate the Church or to subvert it. Ideologically, the
Church's existence is repugnant to them. Allegiance to God prevents
total allegiance to and subjugation by the State, which, according to
Marx, is the salvific vehicle for the secular transformation of man into
god.
The Communists cannot tolerate this limitation on their absolute
power. Thus, in the Soviet Union all but a tiny percentage of churches
have been closed and religious affiliation routinely brings the loss of
precious privileges and sometimes brings more serious persecution.
In Nicaragua, the self-admitted Marxist-Leninist leaders of the
government are following the same path. They are seeking to turn the
Catholic Church, by far the largest in Nicaragua, into an arm of the
government.
-Ronald Reagan 13
3
The Catholic Church' 34 has always been a dominant force in Latin
America and Nicaragua. It has usually functioned as an extremely con-
servative political force in Nicaragua. The Church adamantly supported
the Somoza dictatorships. The extent of this support is illustrated by a
declaration of the Church encouraging Catholics to support the dictators
because "for Catholics it must be a true and extolling doctrine that all
authority comes from God... and that when they obey the government
they do not debase themselves, but rather they perform an act which
deep down constitutes a compliance with God."1 35 Priests actively par-
ticipated in the overthrow of Somoza and continue to be active in the
FSLN. x36 However, the official Church hierarchy has vocally opposed
the FSLN since the Revolution.1 37 The power of the Church in Nicara-
133. Persecution of Religious Groups in Nicaragua, in NEw NIcARAGUA READER, supra
note 4, at 437-38.
134. Nicaragua is overwhelmingly a Catholic country. A November 10, 1981, poll in La
Prensa claimed 80% of Nicaraguans profess to be Catholic. Valenta & Valenta, The FSLNin
Power, reprinted in CoNFLicr IN NICARAGUA, supra note 13, at 22. Other Christian churches
have followings in Nicaragua. For example, the Moravian Church has a following on the
Atlantic Coast.
135. REVOLUTION UNDER SIEGE, supra note 29, at 159. See generally D. GILBERT, supra
note 8, at 130-35 (discussing the Church in Nicaragua and the rise of Liberation Theology).
136. A priest was a member of the original Junta. There are three priests in the Govern-
ment: F. Cardenal, Minister of Education; E. Cardenal, Minister of Culture, and M.
D'Escoto, Foreign Minister. REVOLUTION UNDER SEIGE, supra note 29, at 148.
137. The official church hierarchy, which is opposed to the Revolution, can be separated
from the popular or revolutionary church that supports the FSLN. id. at 135; see Kinzer,
Church Still Thorn for Sandinistas, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1988, at A6, col 4; Eucharistic
Congress in Nicaragua, Barricada International, Nov. 27, 1986, at 5, col 1.
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gua, as well as the active part members of the Church have played in the
Revolution, required that the constitutional drafters be very sensitive to
the Church's contributions to the Revolution and the possibility that the
Church might organize opposition to the Revolution.
The 1974 Somoza Constitution severely limited the role of the
Church in politics. That Constitution prohibited
political propaganda... in any form, by any member of the clergy,
laymen, or ministers of any cult, by invoking religious motives or using
religious beliefs.... Furthermore, no criticism of the laws of the state,
the government, or in particular public officials is permitted in temples
in connection with acts of worship or religious services. 138
This provision is even more restrictive when read in light of the severe
limitations on public assembly and freedom of speech in the 1974 Consti-
tution.139 The Consitution prohibited "expression of religious beliefs...
contrary to morality, good custom, or public order." 140  The repressive
Somoza Constitution is similar to other Latin American constitutions in
its strict control of the Church.141
The new Constitution is much more lenient in its treatment of the
Church, but the intent to neutralize the political impact of religion re-
mains obvious. The compromises made in the area of religion are evident
from the first page of the Constitution. Despite suggestions from the
Church and religious leaders, the Constitution does not invoke "God" in
the Preamble.142 But the Preamble does invoke the "Christians who
moved by their faith in God committed and dedicated themselves to the
struggle for the liberation.... "143 The Constitution establishes no offi-
cial religion.1" But it specifically protects an individual's right to pro-
138. NICAR. CONST. 1974, supra note 20, art. 17.
139. See, e.g., id. art. 2 (limiting the power of the people to assume the representation of
their own grievances), art. 72 (allowing subsequent punishment of oral or written ideas and
allowing for the establishment of censorship), and art. 73 (limiting the right to public
meetings).
140. Id. art. 121.
141. See, e.g., MEXICO CONST. art. 27 (prohibiting ownership of property by the church
and prohibiting it from political or educational activity).
142. For a discussion of the proposals of certain political parties in Nicaragua that the
Constitution invoke "God," see, e.g., L.A. Times, Jan. 9, 1987, at 12, col. 1; L.A. Times, Oct.
20, 1986, at 8, col. 1.
143. First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, preamble.
144. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 14. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. .. .") with Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion' clause ... means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.").
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fess 45 and the social right'" to practice religion.
In the Second Draft, clergy were prohibited from serving as Presi-
dent and Vice President, 47 but all other positions in government ap-
peared open to them." No explicit restrictions on the political activities
by the clergy appear in the final Constitution.
. Although religion lies outside the boundaries of the control of the
Constitution (because it is protected from state intervention), it is pre-
cisely its exclusion that is supposed to neutralize religion within the polit-
ical sphere. In any situation where religion could have a powerful role in
society, that action is prohibited by the Constitution. It is, for example,
no accident that individuals only have the right to profess or not profess
a religion.' 49 The practice of religion is a social and not an individual
right. 5 ° And the Constitution makes clear the limited claims of religion
if this neutralizing effect fails. Certain passages of the Constitution limit
religious freedom. For example, "no one may disobey the law or prevent
others from exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties by invoking
religious beliefs or inclinations."' 151 This provision apparently is aimed at
conscientious objectors1 52 who might try to avoid the duty of military
145. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, arts. 29-30.
146. Id. art. 69. It should be noted that by the terms of the Constitution the right to
practice a religion is only a social right.
147. Those positions required "secular status." Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37,
art. 143.
148. Cf First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, art. 204 (limiting membership in the
electoral Branch to those "not a member of a religious order").
149. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 29. See OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ("PRO-
FESS: (1) to have made one's profession of religion; ... to take the vow of some religious order,
esp. to become a monk or nun.... (2) to declare openly, announce or affirm... in later use
often colored by def. 3.... (3) to make profession of, to lay claim to (some quality or feeling);
often implying insincerity as 'to profess and not practice.' ").
150. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 69.
151. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 69. Cf Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37,
art. 68(2) (prohibiting individuals from invoking "their religious beliefs or discipline to evade
complying with the laws or impede others from exercising their rights or duties"). See also
VENaL CONST. art. 65 (identical language to provision of Second Draft); West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting):
The constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not
create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma. Religious loyalties may be exercised without hindrance
from the state, not the state may not exercise that which except by leave of religious
loyalties is within the domain of temporal power. Otherwise each individual could
set up his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the pub-
lic good by those whose business it is to make laws.
152. But see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1965) (both interpreting the conscientious objection provisions of the selective service
law); G. GuNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1528 (1lth ed. 1985) (discussing conscientious
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service"5 3 imposed by article 99. It could have a much broader sweep by
severely limiting "free exercise" of religion in other situations. 1 4  It
could be interpreted to mean that a citizen's highest duty is to the state
rather than to his or her own conscience. Thus, rather than adhereing to
its secular premises, the Constitution might limit or threaten to limit the
practice of religion to those areas in which it would not have an impact
upon the state. This provision could provide the government with lever-
age to control the Church if it needs it.
Religious concerns motivated other provisions in the Constitution.
For example, the Nicaraguan Constitution would seem to prohibit abor-
tion. 155 The Constitution specifically allows for religious education as an
extra-curricular subject in private schools.156
The Constitution makes a number of responses to the historic role
that the Church has played in Nicaraguan politics. It is uncertain how
the Constitution will affect religious life in Nicaragua, but it does not
appear that the FSLN is trying to eliminate religion completely. On the
contrary, the Constitution appears to protect religion in some circum-
stances, in an attempt to neutralize religious political power. The only
points of potential conflict appear to be when individuals use religion as a
bulwark against state power. One writer recently has noted that there
seems to be increasing official toleration of the traditional Catholic
Church within Nicaragua today. 157 He notes, for example, that all nine
members of the directorate attended the state funeral mass of Nora As-
torga, the former Nicaraguan United Nations Ambassador.5 8 In the
past, state functions did not include full Catholic masses, and few gov-
ernment members appeared at religious services.
B. The Indigenous Peoples
While all this [the Nicaraguan situation] is terrible, it can hardly
objector status in the United States as a matter of legislative grace and not a constitutional
requirement).
153. A compulsory military draft was imposed in 1984. Decree No. 1327, reprinted In
PRINCIPALES LEYES APROBADAS, supra note 22. It has proven to be very unpopular.
154. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down the conviction of
Mennonites for violating state compulsory school attendance law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (striking down unemployment eligibility provisions that constrain religious
freedom).
155. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, arts. 23, 74. Article 23 provides that "[T]he right to life
is inviolable and inherent to all ersons." Article 74 provides that "the state grants special
protection to the process of human reproduction."
156. Id. art. 124.
157. Messing, Who are the Sandinistas?, N.Y. REv. oF BooKs, May 12, 1988, at 51, 55-56,
158. Id.
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come as a surprise to those who know what was done to the Miskito
Indians.... Twenty thousand Indians are known to be incarcerated in
relocation camps.... In all, tens of thousands of Miskitos have been
forced to flee Nicaragua, to flee the land they lived on for over a thou-
sand years. Many now live as refugees in Honduras.
-Ronald Reagan 15 9
In other areas the Constitution attempts to be more inclusive as a
way of broadening and diversifying the meaning of Nicaraguan and, not
incidentally, legitimating governmental (state) power in certain areas
where it has not existed before. Part of this self-definition is a response to
the critics of Nicaragua in the United States and elsewhere. A key exam-
ple of this inclusiveness and expansiveness can be found in the Constitu-
tion's treatment of indigenous peoples.
Several large lakes and a mountain range divide Nicaragua on a
north-south axis. The large population centers of Nicaragua lie on the
western, Pacific Coast of Nicaragua."6 The Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua
and the groups of indigenous peoples who live there, especially the Mis-
kito Indians, have developed separately from the rest of Nicaragua. 161
Their languages, culture, and ethnic background differ markedly from
those of the rest of Nicaragua. The population consists of a mix of Indi-
ans, Africans (descended from slaves), as well as other races.' 62  The
coast was colonized and controlled primarily by the British instead of the
Spanish, and it has a Caribbean rather than a Latin American sensibil-
ity. 6 ' The Atlantic Coast is much less developed than the Pacific region
of Nicaragua.164
Prior to the Revolution, no attempt had been made to integrate the
two parts of Nicaragua. For example, a coast-to-coast road was not built
until the late 1970s. The FSLN has consistently stated as a goal the uni-
159. Address by President Ronald Reagan (April 15, 1985), reprinted in NEw NICARAGUA
READER, supra note 4, at 11.
160. THE CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 598 (1983). Less than 9% of the popula-
tion live in the eastern half of the country. G. BLACK, supra note 98, at 211.
161. See Bourgois, Nicaragua's Ethnic Minorities in the Revolution, reprinted in NEw NIC-
ARAGUA READER, supra note 4, at 459-60.
162. The races on the Atlantic Coast include Miskitos (23.8%), Creole Blacks (9.1%),
Sumo (1.7%), Carib (.5%), and Rama (.2%). See REvOLUTION UNDER SIEGE, Supr note 29,
at 178.
163. For a history of the Atlantic coast from its European discovery by Columbus into the
20th century, see generally C. DOZIER, NICARAGUA'S MosQurro SHORE: THE YEARS OF
BRrrISH AND AMERICAN PRESENCE (1985).
164. Interestingly, the development of Puerto Cabezas, one of the two major towns on the
Atlantic Coast, was the result of development by the United States military during World War
II. Puerto Cabezas was also the launching point for the Bay of Pigs Invasion. S. CHRISTIAN,
NICARAGUA. REvOLUION IN THE FAMILY 256 (1985).
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fication of the two areas of the country. 16 The Constitution reflects and
implements that goal while trying to respect the rights of people of the
Atlantic Coast. 166
Shortly after the Sandinistas assumed power, they forced "unifica-
tion" upon the peoples of the Atlantic Coast without much regard for the
individual rights of the Indians. In trying to unify and defend the coun-
try, the Sandinista Government forcibly relocated a large group of indig-
enous people from the Honduran-Nicaraguan border in 1982.167 The
Sandinistas claimed that the relocation was necessary because groups of
indigenous people were hiding Contras near the border.168 This reloca-
tion and other repressive treatment of the Indian population, such as en-
couraging the use of Spanish for official business rather than allowing the
use of English or native languages of the various groups, has been criti-
cized by both adversaries, such as President Reagan, and supporters of
the regime, as a gross violation of human rights. 169 In reaction to these
and other FSLN actions, individuals from the Atlantic Coast communi-
ties became Contra leaders.17 The Sandinistas have since admitted mis-
takes and human rights violations in their handling of the Atlantic Coast
situation.
These incidents, as well as the continual opposition of the peoples of
the Atlantic Coast to the Sandinista government, 171 require an examina-
tion of the treatment of the rights of the indigenous peoples in the Consti-
tution. Again, the drafters of the Constitution were forced to respond to
165. Historic Program of the FSLN, reprinted in SANDINISTAS SPEAK, supra note 82, at 19.
("The Sandinista People's Revolution will put into practice a special plan for the Atlantic
Coast, which has been abandoned to total neglect.").
166. See, eg., NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, preamble, arts. 87, 89.
167. See, eg., DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS,
584-85 (1982) (history of relocation).
168. A World Court decision defined this border in 1960 and split the indigenous peoples
between the two countries.
169. See, eg., LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 64; INTER-AMERICAN COM-
MISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF A Svo-
MENT OF THE NICARAGUAN POPULATION OF MISKITO ORIGIN (1984). See also Cranhan,
Political Legitimacy and Dissent, reprinted in CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA, supra note 13, at 101
n.9.
170. Leaders of the Contra forces were initially drawn from the Atlantic Coast, but since
1981 the Indians have been fighting a distinct war with the Sandinistas. The leaders of the
peoples of the Atlantic Coast, Brooklyn Rivera and Steadman Fagoth, have recently been
involved in cease fire talks with the Sandinistas. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1988, at 6, col. 1.
171. Many of the Contras are from the Atlantic Coast. See, e.g., Valenta & Valenta, The
FSLN in Power, in CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA, supra note 13, at 21, (5000 Indians joined
FDN).
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critics. The Constitution reflects the drafters' awareness of a hostile
audience.
The rights of the indigenous peoples comprise two separate chapters
in the Constitution. 72 These chapters protect ethnic minorities from dis-
crimination and place an affirmative duty upon the state to create laws
that prevent discrimination.'73 But these chapters and the Constitution
also stress the goal of the "integration" of the indigenous peoples. Arti-
cle 89 states that the Atlantic Coast is integral to the Nicaraguan nation
and that ethnic groups have a right to develop their identities within a
framework of national unity. 17 4 "Unity" is, in fact, one of the goals of
the Constitution."'
A structural reading of the entire Constitution could result in the
people of the Atlantic Coast being forcibly integrated into the rest of the
country. In spite of the broad language protecting the indigenous peo-
ples, each article must be read in the context of the entire Constitution.
For example, Spanish is established by the Constitution as the official
language of Nicaragua.'76 The constitutional status of languages of in-
digenous peoples is unclear. Article 11 (the language provision) provides
that "[tihe languages of the indigenous people and the ethnic communi-
ties of Nicaragua shall also have official usage in all cases established by
law."' 7 7 The same section of the First Draft provided that the indige-
nous people had a right to the use and development of their languages. 17
The final text of the Constitution thus signals a shift towards integration.
Similarly, the Chapter on indigenous peoples provides for the free use of
172. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, arts. 89-91. See also arts. 180-81 (establishing autono-
mous government in Atlantic Coast regions).
173. Id art. 91 ('The state is obligated to enact laws promoting and assuring that no Nica-
raguan shall be the object of discrimination for reasons of language, culture, or origin.").
174. Id art. 89.
175. Id.
176. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 11. The United States does not have an official
language. Fourteen states have adopted English as their official language: Arkansas (1987),
California (1986), Georgia (1986), Hawaii (1978), Illinois (1969), Indiana (1984), Kentucky
(1984), Mississippi (1987), Nebraska (1920), North Carolina (1987), North Dakota (1987),
South Carolina (1987), Tennessee (1984), and Virginia (1950).
177. Id Compare BRAZ. CONST. art. 147, para. 3 (barring those who do not speak the
national language from voting) with Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45, 51-
52 (1959) (states to institute literacy tests to vote since "Illiteracy and illiteracy are neutral on
race, creeds, color and sex .. "); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding
portions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that prohibits literacy tests); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding portions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 that pro-
hibited literacy tests in any state in the United States).
178. First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, art. 19; L. TRiBE, CoNsTrrTuToNAL LAw
1673-1687 (2d ed. 1988).
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ethnic languages as an expression of culture, but gives the languages no
official use until the National Assembly creates such a use. 179 The fact
that the official use of the languages is left to the National Assembly's
discretion provides very little weight in terms of a constitutional right.
The people of the Atlantic Coast do have access to education in their
own languages, but only "up to levels set by national plans and
programs."180
In the chapters on the people of the Atlantic Coast, "[t]he state
recognizes the communal forms of land ownership.., and their enjoy-
ment, use and benefit of the waters and forests of these communal
lands." ' This broad provision conflicts with the article on natural re-
sources, which states that the natural resources of Nicaragua are national
patrimony and the state shall decide on the 'best uses for these
resources. 
182
Perhaps the most telling phrase in the Constitution is the explicit
protection of majority rights. Article 4 states that the Nicaraguan state
shall "ensure that the interests and rights of the majority prevail." 18 3
Although this article could have a significant impact on a number of
areas of constitutional discourse, it most obviously affects the ethnic mi-
norities of the Atlantic Coast.
The Constitutional provisions for the people of the Atlantic Coast
are less than ideal because they do not provide clear protection. Instead
the provisions stress the need of the Government to unify and protect the
country. Although these provisions seem weak, particularly when read
in the context of the rest of the Constitution, it should be noted that the
United States Constitution hardly mentions the Native Americans and
contains no language specifically protecting them.18 4 In fact, other coun-
tries have been more explicit than Nicaragua in allowing discrimination
against native populations in their constitutions.1 8 5 In the context of
Latin American constitutions it is significant that the Constitution men-
tions the rights of indigenous peoples at all.186 The Constitution of Gua-
179. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 90.
180. Id. art. 121.
181. Id. art. 89.
182. Id. art. 102.
183. Id. art. 4.
184. See, eg., U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 8.
185. Cf KENYA CONST. § 82 (allowing discrimination if "reasonably justifiable in a demo-
cratic society").
186. See, eg., Indians Rights Rediscovered, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1987, at A26, col. 1 (dis-
cussing the problems of various indigenous peoples throughout Latin America).
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temala, for example, never mentions the status of the Maya.1 87 But other
constitutions have extended significant protections to indigenous
peoples.18s
C. Foreign Intervention and Foreign Policy
I truly believe the history of this century forces me to believe that
to do nothing in Central America is to give the first Communist
stronghold on the North American continent a green light to spread its
poison throughout this free and increasingly democratic hemi-
sphere.... We cannot have the United States walk away from one of
the greatest moral challenges in postwar history. I pledge to you that
we will do everything we can to win this struggle.
-Ronald Reagan189
In creating a new Nicaragua, the most troublesome issue in the Nic-
araguan past and which continues to be a current problem is the "rela-
tionship" between Nicaragua and the United States. In defining how
they will deal with the United States, Nicaragua begins to define itself.
In addition to being a definitional problem, the United States is also a
political and foreign policy problem. The Constitution's attempts to deal
with this relationship acknowledge both of these aspects.
The history of Nicaragua has been a history of intervention and the
continual threat of intervention, particularly by the United States. This
history is repeated and re-written in the Invocation, where it is presented
as the history of the struggle for national independence. This signifies a
profound act of recovery and re-definition for Nicaragua, and it legiti-
mates the FSLN within Nicaragua as the heir to this tradition of
struggle.
The struggle against intervention continues to the present day so
that, in addition to creating its rightful claim to rule, the Party also uses
the Constitution as a step toward dealing with a problem that tradition-
ally lies beyond the scope of a constitution. In effect, the Nicaraguan
Constitution attempts to expand the boundaries of the Constitution to
incorporate an international dispute. It does this in two ways: first, by
187. See generally Rhoodie, Discrimination in the Constitutions of the World; GUATE.iALA
CONST.
188. See, eg., INDIAN CONST. arts. 330, 332 (reserving seats in legislature); 338-40 (pro-
moting social and economic development); PAKISTANI CONST. Part XI, chap. 3 (same). For a
survey of United Nations proposals on indigenous rights see Hannum, New Developments in
Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 649 (1988).
189. Address by President Ronald Reagan (Apr. 15, 1985), reprinted in NEwv NICARAuA
READER, supra note 4, at 14.
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explicitly considering and attempting to influence and control the actions
of other countries and foreign policy relationships in the Constitution
and, second, by consciously writing the Constitution in such a way that it
appeals and responds to hostile, and/or foreign audiences.
There has been increasing displeasure with the Sandinistas both in-
side and outside Nicaragua. 190 Armed Nicaraguans, the Contras, are
waging an unsuccessful campaign to unseat the )FSLN. 191 President
Reagan made his administration's dissatisfaction with the Nicaraguan
Government known through his public statements and his support for
the Contras.'92 Even when Congress refused to give the Contras money,
the Reagan Administration still found ways of funneling money to the
Contras. 193
The language of the Constitution responds to historical reality by
seeming to address directly the possible aggressor (a possible aggressor, it
should be noted, who is named in the Invocation). Passages in the Con-
stitution, while defining the resolve and determination of Nicaragua, ap-
parently directly address a foreign audience with the hope of results. The
importance of these passages is emphasized by their placement in the
very first article in the Constitution. The first article of the Constitution
states, "any foreign interference in the internal affairs of Nicaragua or
any attempt to undermine these rights [of Nicaraguans] is an attack on
the life of the people." 194 Article 27 states that "foreigners may not in-
tervene in the political affairs of the country."' 19 Other articles in the
Constitution reinforce this principle. Article 5 states the principle of
190. See generally NEw NICARAGUA READER, supra note 4, part 1, for an overview of
various positions in the debate on the Nicaraguan situation.
191. See, e g., Lesar, Revolution in Nicaragua, in CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA, supra note 13.
192. See, eg., Exec. Order No. 12513 (May 1, 1985), reprinted in NEw NICARAGUA
READER, supra note 4, at 312-14. ("I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of
America, find that the policies and actions of the government of Nicaragua constitute an unu-
sual and extraordinary threat to national security and foreign policy of the United States and
[I] hereby declare a national emergency to deal with the threat.") (prohibiting the importation
of Nicaraguan goods); The President's News Conference (August 12, 1986), 86 DEPT. O1'
STATE BULL. 2, 5 (Oct. 1986) ("Nicaragua is a totalitarian, communist state. It is a sort of a
vassal of the Soviet Union."). See generally President Reagan, Why Democracy Matters in
Central America (June 24, 1986), 86 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 18 (Sept. 1986).
193. See generally IRAN CONTRA REPORT, supra note 4, at 37-136 (discussing the history
of United States involvement with Contras). A detailed history of United States funding of the
Contras under the Reagan Administration can be found in Bentley, Keeping Secrets: The
Church Committee, Covert Action, and Nicaragua, 25 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601, 624-44
(1987).
194. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 1.
195. Id. art. 27.
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nonalignment in foreign policy. 196 Article 6 states the principle of na-
tional independence. 197 The principles of nonalignment and indepen-
dence are straightforward statements of foreign policy and self-definition.
The other two statements attempt to affect actions by other countries and
to institutionalize one of the goals of the FSLN, to end United States
intervention. 198 The provisions have the symbolic value of legitimizing
the FSLN's program, a major premise of the Revolution, but their in-
strumental value is limited.
As was discussed above, the drafting of the Constitution was also
influenced by the various internal and external groups that would read it.
Thus any "pure" attempt at self-definition was limited by the reality that
the Constitution was written with certain audiences in mind.
The continuing international dispute over Nicaragua put the draft-
ers of the Constitution in a difficult position. Because external critics of
the FSLN and of Nicaragua could use the text of the Constitution as
evidence to support their criticisms of the FSLN, the drafters were highly
aware of the United States Government and other critics as audiences of
the Constitution.'99 It is axiomatic that writers write for audiences and
that the intended audience influences the work. The usual audience for a
constitution are the politicians and citizens of the country. The Nicara-
guan Constitution addresses those groups, as well as other important in-
terest groups within Nicaragua. What is unusual about the Nicaraguan
Constitution is that it addresses a foreign audience and tries to structure
that audience's relationship with Nicaragua. Some of the provisions in
the Constitution were probably even written in response to international
concerns. The watchful eye of the United States Government is evident
throughout the Constitution, and the drafters even seemed to hope that
their Constitution could influence the United States.
196. Id. art. 5. Foreign policy provisions also appear in other developing countries' consti-
tutions. See, ag., foreign policy provisions in the ETHIOPIA CONST. arts. 27-30 (goals of prole-
tarian internationalism, peaceful coexistence, and nonalignment); arts. 24-26 (various
provisions on national defense).
197. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 6.
198. Historic Program of the RSLN, reprinted in SANDINISTAs SPEAK, supra note 82, at
IX(A).
199. Only in the last few years have scholars turned their attention to the significance of
audiences. Although intuitively obvious, the main conclusions of this audience-based criticism
have been that writers' intentions vary with their intended audiences, and the text provides
clues as to the audience. In studying any constitution, and in particular the Nicaraguan Con-
stitution, what is interesting is examining how different articles seem to be written for different
audiences and evaluating how the constitution works as a whole. See generally P. Rabinowitz,
Truth in Fiction: A Reexamination of Audiences, 4 CRMcAL INQUIRY 121 (Aut. 1977) (dis-
cussing how authors envision different types of audiences in fiction).
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The ability of the Constitution to change the actions of other coun-
tries as a legal matter is very limited. One reason that the FSLN might
want statements about other countries in the Constitution is to prevent
the United States from claiming that a future invasion was requested by
the people of Nicaragua. The validity of such a use is severely limited
because any successful invasion would likely result in the end of the
Constitution.
Ironically, provisions attempting to regulate the actions of other
states also show that the Sandinistas believe that, because the United
States and other governments respect the rule of law, the Constitution
might prevent invasion. Of course, there is some doubt about the United
States Government's respect for the rule of law in international law .20
The FSLN's faith in the rule of law in this context seems to contradict its
more instrumental legal realist statements in other situations, where it
holds that the goals of the Revolution are more important than the
law.201
Each of the three areas of conflict discussed in this section show how
the Constitution reflects its social and historical circumstances. Despite
attempts to draft a constitution that is "timeless" and forward-looking,
drafters must respond to contemporary circumstances. Constitutional
provisions illustrate how the drafters respond to various audiences such
as the Church, international organizations, and even other governments,
in constitution-making.
IV. LEGITIMATION AND LIMITATION
The tension and conflict between limiting and legitimating power in
Nicaragua permeates the entire Constitution. They center on the role of
the Party in the Constitution and Government, and the ability of the
governmental structure, particularly the Judiciary, to control the Party.
The tension doubles or reappears in the idea of a revolutionary constitu-
tion (i.e., the notion, made explicit in the Constitution, that the Constitu-
tion institutionalizes the Revolution and the revolutionary process while
containing, constraining, and limiting the same). The doubling of these
two issues (limiting and legitimating the FSLN and the Revolution) is
200. Malawer, Reagan's Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-87. The Reagan "Corollary" of In-
ternational Law, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 85 (1988). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits-Judgment), reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 1023 (1986).
201. See infra note 302 and accompanying text (discussing the Sandinista notion of revolu-
tionary justice).
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particularly noteworthy because of the strong identification in the Con-
stitution between the FSLN and the Revolution.
The first part of this section examines the formal and informal roles
of the FSLN in the Constitution. Although the Party has few official
constitutional powers, the structure of the Constitution allows it to main-
tain and exercise pervasive power. Given the power of the FSLN in the
Government and the Constitution, and the constitutional requirement
that the Executive and Legislative branches should act in coordination,
the judicial branch takes on significant importance as a balance of power.
The next section examines the institutionalizing and limiting functions of
a constitution in light of two issues concerning the connection between a
revolution and a constitution: 1) the interpretive role that the revolution
should play in the constitution, and 2) an examination of the apparent
oxymoron of a "revolutionary constitution."
A. Legitimation of the FSLN
The most important and controversial issues in the Nicaraguan
Constitution are the role of the FSLN in the constitutional structure and
the ability of the FSLN to maintain and establish political control
through the Constitution. Although the FSLN has no formal constitu-
tional status, the Party is able to maintain significant control within the
country through the Constitution.
The FSLN is the dominant political party in Nicaragua. It is the
organization that led the revolution. The Party is an elite (members are
selected for membership rather than volunteering) vanguard2z party
consisting of less than three percent of the population." 3 The Party is
led by a nine person National Directorate that supervises various na-
tional, regional, and local organizations.'
The FSLN, as the dominant and ruling political party in Nicara-
202. The Party referred to itself as a "vanguard organization" and advocated direct strug-
gle to establish a particular social system. Historic Program, reprinted in SANDINISTAS SPEAK,
supra note 82, at 13, 21-22; General Political-Military Platform of the FSLN, reprinted in CON-
FLiCT IN NICARAGUA, supra note 13, at 308-09:
Our numerically small revolutionary vanguard detachment is the advance nucleus of
the great majority of our people who express through their vanguard what Che de-
scribed as the will to conquest, even though they themselves may not fight directly
with arms. Our current revolutionary vanguard organization, the FSLN, represents
the central axis of all the other popular and revolutionary forces.... The Sandinista
vanguard, in assuming its historical role, should correctly assign (delimiter) duties
among the masses.... We are trying to create a mass struggle without enlarging
(masiicar) the FSLN.
203. D. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 52.
204. Id. at 48.
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gua,20 5 sought to use the constitutional drafting process to institutional-
ize and legitimize the Revolution and the Party's role in the Government
without explicitly institutionalizing the Party in the Constitution20 6 or
creating a one party state.2°7 In constitutional drafting sessions the other
political parties2 °0 stressed that the Government should be multi-partied,
like western democracies. 20
9
205. Opposition political parties are legal in Nicaragua. See La Ley de Parlidos Politicos,
Decree No. 312 (Aug. 17, 1983), reprinted in PRINCIPALES LEYES APROBADAS, supra note 22.
But the President, Vice President, and 60% of the National Assembly are FSLN members.
206. The institutionalization of a single party in a constitution is an idea popular in com-
munist and developing countries. See, e.g., PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONST. OF 1978
[hereinafter 1978 CHINA CONST.]; TANZANIA CONST. (1977). The notion is that, for one rea-
son or another, a single party deserves constitutional status. See, e.g., 1978 CHINA CONST,
supra, art. 2 ("The Communist Party of China is the core leadership of the whole Chinese
people"); art. 56 ("Citizens must support the leadership of the Communist Party of China.").
The rationale for single party states in developing countries is that, after the overthrow of
colonial rule, the independent political system is so fragile that single-party systems are the
only way the country can become unified and overcome the great political and economic obsta-
cles it faces. See, ag., I.C.J., SINGLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN ZAMBIA (1973). In single
party countries a single party may be the only legal party. See, e.g., TANZANIA CONST. (1977),
art. 3 ("Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) shall be the sole political party in Tanzania and...
shall exercise final authority in respect to all matters."), or restrictions may be placed upon
elected office so that only members of one party are eligible. See, e.g., KENYA CONsT. (Rev.
1983) § 5(3)(a). ("[E]very candidate for President shall be a member of the Kenya African
National Union and shall be nominated by that party in the manner prescribed by or under an
Act of Parliament."); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A ONE-PARTY PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA (1972) (recommendation by the
commission that the President be a dues-paying member.)
In the constitutions of Communist countries, the Party has contitutional status because It
is "the vanguard of the people." ETHIOPIA CONST., art. 6 (draft, June 1986) ("The Worker's
Party of Ethiopia... is a vanguard political party that is dedicated to serve working people...
(2) The Worker's Party of Ethiopia determines the perspective for development of the country
and is the guiding force of the state and the entire society."); CUBA CONST. art. 5 ("The
Communist Party of Cuba.. .is the highest leading force of the society and of the state, which
organizes and guides the common effort.. . ."). The justification md theory behind Commu-
nist Party rule is therefore more ideological and less instrumental than the single party system
in developing countries.
207. See Constitutional Proposals of the FSLN, reprinted in SANDINISTAS SPEAK, supra
note 82, § II ("The party's interests coincided with the interests of the people.").
208. The major political parties in Nicaragua are the Popular Action Movement-Marxist-
Leninist (MAP-ML) Party, the Nicaraguan Communist Party (PCdeN), the Nicaraguan So-
cialist Party (PSN), the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) (similar to European Labor Parties),
the Democratic Conservative Party (PCD), the Social Christian Party (PSC), the Popular So-
cial Christian Party (PPSC) (a group of socialist Catholics who split from the PSC, the Social
Democratic Party (PSD), the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC), the Nicaraguan Con-
servative Party (PCN), and the FSLN.
209. The United States Constitution contains no mention of political parties. The leaders
of the country at the time of the United States Revolution warned the people against parties,
See, e.g., Washington's Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in R. MORRIS, BASIC
DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 70, 74 (1956) ("[Political parties] serve to organize fac-
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The Sandinistas did not explicitly institutionalize the Party in the
Constitution. The Party, as a party, is not given any special status in the
organization of the Government. The Second Draft of the Nicaraguan
Constitution guaranteed political pluralism, which is defined as "the
existence and participation of all political organizations... without ideo-
logical restriction, except those who advocate a return to a Somoza style
of government."21 0 The Second Draft recognized the right to organize
political parties with the same limitation.211 The final Constitution does
not outlaw any parties.21 2
Although the FSLN did not try to institutionalize the Party per se
into the Constitution, it did advocate a variety of provisions that have the
effect of institutionalizing the Party's power. In its initial constitutional
draft, the FSLN argued for constitutional provisions that "institu-
tional[ized] the Sandinista People's Army, the Sandinista People's Mili-
tia, the Sandinista Police, 213... the principle of respect and veneration of
the heroes and martyrs of the Revolution," 214 and a "constitutional
guarantee of support and recognition to the mothers, children, widows,
and families of the nation's heroes and martyrs." 215
1. The Sandinista Army
The Party was not successful in obtaining all of its goals, but the
tions... to put in place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party, often a small but
artful and enterprising minority of the community, and according to the alternate triumphs of
different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incon-
gruous projects of factions rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans....").
210. Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37, art. 5. Although such limitation might
make liberals in the United States cringe, the constitutions of other liberal western countries
prohibit certain types of political activity. See, ag., CRIM. CODE §§ 86-88 (W. Ger.) (prohibit-
ing distribution of Nazi propaganda.); BASIc LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY, GRUNDGESETz art. 21 (1987) (W. Ger.) (similar limitations upon political parties);
IRISH CONST. art. 40.6(I)(iii) ("expression... shall not be used to undermine public order or
morality or the authority of the state.").
211. Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37, art. 57.
212. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 55 ("Nicaraguan citizens have the right to organize
... political parties.. . ."). But see art. 5 ("Political pluralism... without ideological restric-
tions, except those who seek a return to the past... ."). It is not unusual for constitutions or
governments to try to outlaw certain political parties. See, eg., BAsic LAW OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 21 (defining parties that seek "to do away with the liberal demo-
cratic order or [that] endanger The Federal Republic of Germany" as unconstitutional.). See
generally Franz, Unconstitutional and Outlawed Political Pardew" A German-American Com-
parison, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 51 (1982).
213. Constitutional Proposals of the FSLN, reprinted in SANDINISTAS SPEAK, supra note 82,
at 812, provision 17.
214. Id. provision 18.
215. Id. provision 19.
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Constitution implicitly provides many ways for the Party to exercise con-
trol.216 As President Daniel Ortega has said, "We cannot think that the
FSLN is here and the structures of the State and the Armed Forces are
elsewhere. The FSLN is the motor force of everything and its cadres are
present in all areas of revolutionary life." '217 The most important provi-
sion designates the Sandinista Army as the National Army of Nicaragua.
It has always been an explicit goal of the Sandinistas to establish a "patri-
otic revolutionary, and people's army with an eye toward strengthening
their patriotic spirit....2 The Constitution declares that the National
Army is the "Sandinista Popular Army.. .[t]he direct descendant of the
Liberation Army," but it requires the Army to obey the Constitution. 21 9
This restriction limits the Army's discretion. Although Party control of
the Army and the power of the Army are limited by the Constitution, the
result is a "political" army.
Prior drafts of the Constitution provided even more power to the
Army. The First Draft declared the Sandinista Army as the only armed
forces in the country, 220 but did not give the Sandinista militia and police
constitutional status as the FSLN had proposed.221 The First Draft
characterized the Sandinista Armed Forces as "the strategic instrument
of national defense and revolutionary gains, of public security and for the
preservation of inner stability." 222
The Second Draft limited the Sandinista Armed Forces to the role
of defense.223 Article 92 provided that the Popular Sandinista Army is
"the armed wing of the people and direct descendant of the Defense
Army of National Sovereignty. It is the responsibility of the... Army to
prepare, organize, and direct the popular participation in defense of the
Homeland." This language limits the discretion that the military would
have had under the First Draft because the Army is not empowered to
take action to preserve the Revolution. The Second Draft relegated in-
ternal security to the powers of the state, rather than the Army.2 24 Im-
portantly, in the Second Draft the President had the power to declare
216. See, eg., text accompanying note 67.
217. Daniel Ortega, Barricada, (Jan. 8, 1985), quoted in D. GILIIERT, supra note 8, at 59-
61.
218. Historic Program of the FSLN, reprinted in SANDINISTAS SPEAK, supra note 82, art.
XII.
219. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 95.
220. First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, art. 179.
221. Constitutional Proposals of the FSLN, reprinted in SANDINISTAS SPEAK, supra note 82,
provision 17.
222. First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, art. 177.
223. Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37, art. 92.
224. Id. art. 94.
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war.
225
Despite these concessions, the Constitution still treats the Army as a
political rather than an independent institution under the control of the
FSLN. In an attempt to minimize the appearance of a political army, a
member of the FSLN stated that the Army is named after the patriot
Augusto Sandino rather than the Party." 6 That explanation of the Con-
stitutional title of the Army is a very legalistic and almost laughable dis-
tinction because the FSLN also took its name from Sandino; therefore
there is practically no distinction. The Army is also explicitly recognized
in the Constitution as "a direct descendant of the Army in Defense of
National Sovereignty," which was the army of the FSLN. 7
The FSLN has the additional benefit of control over the Armed
Forces of Nicaragua by providing a means to consolidate power by
teaching the draftees about the Revolution and the Party. The FSLN has
said that if the Army is truly to be of the people "performing an essential
activity of the people-namely defense-we have no reason to deny this
armed people political education.""2  One Army officer stated that since
the draft was instituted in 1983 an effort has been made "to convert the
Army into a great school for the formation of patriotic and revolutionary
values.... [A soldier should return to civilian life] with firmer ideologi-
cal convictions, more patriotic, more Sandinista." 2 9
The FSLN wants to maintain political control over the Army to
prevent the Army from establishing or becoming a separate power base.
The FSLN insistence on a politically controlled army has roots deep in
Latin American history. Professional armies have overthrown elected
governments throughout Latin America, in such countries as Chile, Ar-
gentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.2 31 The FSLN argues that "the only Latin
225. Ido art. 147(13). That is a significant power. In the United States, for example, Con-
gress has the power to declare war. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. By giving Congress the power to
declare war, and making the President the Commander in Chief, the drafters of the United
States Constitution limited the power of both. See also War Powers Resolution, Pub. L 93-
148, H.R. Res. 542, 93d Cong. §§ 2(a), 3, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (attempting to limit the ability of
the President to introduce armed forces into a conflict without the consent of Congress).
226. Interview with Rafael Solis, Secretary of the National Assembly of Nicaragua and
leader of the FSLN delegation to the constitutional debates, in Political Parties Klew Constitu-
tional Debates, ENvIo, Nov. 1986, at 39 [hereinafter Solis].
227. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 95.
228. Solis, supra note 226, at 39.
229. D. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 63.
230. The example of Allende's Chile is perhaps the most important for Nicaragua. Since
the Sandinista Revolution, the military has also returned power to civilian governments in
Argentina, Spain, and Greece. See generally A. ROUQUiE, THE MILITARY AND THE STATE
IN LATIN AMERICA 248-84 (1987).
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American social revolution to have survived the overbearing influence of
the United States has been Cuba. That would have been inconceivable
without a people's army dedicated to defending the revolution as an inte-
gral part of national sovereignty." '231 In some respects this debate over
the political nature of the Army may be false because the Army is really
no different than any other army in that it is loyal to, and will defend, the
existing regime. In any case, the political character of the Army would
not become a particularly important issue unless a candidate from an-
other party were to win the presidential election. This is unlikely to oc-
cur in the near future.
The final Constitution contains less rhetoric supporting and praising
the Sandinista Army of Liberation than did previous drafts. Unlike the
First Draft, the final text of the Constitution relegates "veneration of the
heroes and martyrs of the Revolution" to the Preamble, rather than to
the body, of the Constitution.232 Furthermore, there is no longer a
Constitutional provision requiring support for the mothers of
revolutionaries.233
2. Mass Organizations
Other constitutional provisions legitimate a role for the FSLN and
allow it to maintain control over the country. The Constitution provides
a special place for the labor, agricultural, and other mass organizations
that are effectively controlled by the FSLN.2 34  Mass organizations are
collective associations intended to further the Sandinista goal of popular
participation.235 Unlike membership in the FSLN, membership in mass
organizations is open to anyone. The mass organizations "link the party
vanguard with the general population. '236 Carlos Nufiez, a member of
the National Directorate, has expressed the FSLN's policy toward mass
organizations:
Under the guidance of the [FSLN], the mass organizations direct
231. Reding, 'By the People': Constitution Making in Nicaragua, CHRISTIANITY AND CRI-
sis, Dec. 8, 1986, at 434, 438.
232. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, preamble.
233. But see id. art. 56 ("The state shall grant special attention in all its programs.., to
the families of those fallen in defense of the nation. .. ").
234. There are six principal Sandinista mass organizations: the Sandinista Defense Com-
mittees; the National Union of Farmers and Cattle Raisers; the Sandinista Workers' Federa-
tion; the Rural Workers' Association; the Luisa Amand Espinosa Association of Nicaraguan
Women; and the Sandinista Youth. D. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 64.
235. For a discussion of the mass organizations see Ruchwarger, The Sandinista Mass Or-
ganizations and the Revolutionary Process, reprinted in REVOLUTION UNDER SIEuE, supra
note 29, at 88-119 and D. GILBERT, supra note 8, at ch. 3.
236. D. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 64.
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themselves... along two important lines. In the first place, our mass
organizations should concern themselves with and work to strengthen
the political project of the Revolution. And in the second place, they
should be real instruments to express, channel, and receive the most
pressing demands of the masses."'2 7
As Nufiez implies, the organizations are closely linked to, and even di-
rected by, the Party.238 They also serve as a recruitment pool for the
Party. In some constitutional provisions, the organizations are the
means through which the people's will is made known.3 9 In other set-
tings, these organizations provide a check upon actions by the Govern-
ment.2" In practice, the FSLN controls these organizations, so that the
organizations provide another means for institutionalizing FSLN
power.
2 41
Finally, the FSLN also added a provision to the Second Draft,
maintained in the final text, that allows the present Government to stay
in power until January 9, 1991.242 Thus, the Party members in the Gov-
ernment will be able to consolidate their power and control in the coun-
try prior to the next election.
In sum, although the Constitution provides some protection for op-
position parties, possibly more than in other revolutionary regimes,
243
the Constitutional structure effectively legitimizes the role of the FSLN
as the leader of the Revolution and allows it to consolidate power by
giving the Party and party organizations constitutional authority.
The only limiting factor or institutional counterweight in the Con-
stitution to the power of the FSLN, besides the specific limiting provi-
sions of the document, is the Judiciary. In the next section the institution
237. D. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 72 (quoting Carlos Nufiez).
238. Id. at 72 (noting how mass organizations explicitly recognize the vanguard status of
the Party).
239. NicAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 81 ("Workers have the right to participate in the
management of their enterprises, through their organizations....").
240. Id art. 111 ("The peasants... have the right to participate, through their own organi-
zations, in establishing the policies of agrarian reformation.").
241. Importantly, Party members do not necessarily lead these groups, and the percentage
of Party members in each group is small. But the five largest mass organizations noted above
are clearly FSLN partisans. There are exceptions to FSLN control of these organizations. For
example, during the early stages of Agrarian Reform in 1981 agricultural groups demanded
changes in FSLN policies. These changes were granted after large demonstrations in
Managua.
242. Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37, art. 197; NICAR. CONST., supra note 3,
art. 201. The most recent agreement between the Central American presidents requires earlier
elections. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1989, at A4, col. 1 (text of agreement calling for elections
by February 25, 1990.).
243. See, e.g., supra notes 194, 198.
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of the Judiciary in the Constitution will be examined, with particular
attention to the structure of the judicial "branch," the independence of
the Judiciary and judges, and the jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
B. Limitation by the Judiciary
1. Separation of Powers and Judicial Review
The Constitution limits the independence of the Judicial Branch and
judges within the judicial system. The structure of the branches of gov-
ernment limits the independence of the judiciary from the other parts of
government. The First Draft declared that "the judicial power of the
state is independent from the other powers of the state." 2" The final text
does not contain any similar statement. The removal of this clause is
telling. As was mentioned earlier, the Constitution imposes explicit lim-
its on the independence of different branches of government and man-
dates that they "coordinate harmoniously."245 In Nicaragua, the
coordination between branches of government severely limits their ability
to review acts of the other branches. This structure of independence dif-
fers from the independence of the Judicial Branch in the United States.246
Although the branches of the Nicaraguan Government are required
to coordinate harmoniously, the Nicaraguan Constitution also specifi-
cally provides for judicial review.24 7 The Constitution allows individuals
244. First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, art. 195.
245. See supra text accompanying note 110; NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 129.
246. See generally Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM, L. Ry.
672 (1980). In the United States, separation of powers, the division of powers between three
competitive branches, is supposed to require independence. THE FEDERALIST, No. 47, (Q.
Madison) ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OP
THE LAWS, Book XI, ch. 6 (All would be lost if the same man or the same ruling, whether of
nobles or of the people were to exercise these three functions.); see also Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the "steel seizure" case) (discussing the separation of
the legislative and executive branches).
247. In the United States, the government is structured to dispense power through different
branches of government, with each branch constitutionally limited to certain powers. See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are
defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is
written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation commit.
ted to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"),
To enforce these provisions there must be an institutional ability to resolve disputes between
the branches, and definitively interpret the validity of laws under the Constitution. Marbury, 5
U.S. at (1 Cranch) 137, 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is."). See generally J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON REPRESENTA-
TIVE GOVERNMENT; THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 (A. Hamilton). This is accomplished through
judicial review. Although the power of judicial review was not stated in the United States
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to "seek judicial review" regarding the unconstitutionality of any law.2 48
No procedure is established, and it is not at all clear to whom one ap-
peals. This lack of established procedure limits the power Nicaraguans
have to protest a law as unconstitutional. 249 It is unclear how the proce-
dure will develop. The Second Draft gave the Supreme Court of Justice
the function of resolving "Recourses of Unconstitutionality."'250 Article
160 of the Second Draft required that the Recourse of Unconstitutional-
ity be initiated by a branch of government other than the Supreme Court
or by the people. 51 This procedure meant that the Judiciary could only
declare a provision unconstitutional when asked to. The power of the
Judiciary would have been significantly limited because the Judiciary
would be unable to overrule a majority of representatives without those
same representatives requesting such a result.2 52
In Nicaragua, the apparent weakness of the Supreme Court might
eliminate the counter-majoritariane 5 3 problem and further the Sandinista
goal of popular participation. The Court is already required to consider
the view of the population. Furthermore, explicit limits and goals have
Constitution, it has long been a fundamental principle. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137. See also THE
FEDERAUST, No. 78, supra note 10, at 229 (A. Hamilton) ("All the reservations with particu-
lar rights or privileges would amount to nothing" without judicial review.).
248. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 187. This is significant because in Mexico and
other Latin American countries judicial review, as it is practiced in the United States, does not
exist. See Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 891, 904-05 (1988)
(discussing lack of judicial review in Mexico).
249. Barker, supra note 248, at 904-05.
250. Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37, Art. 160(d).
251. Id art. 183.
252. In the United States, for example, the judiciary can act against the wishes of everyone
in the country as long as there is a majority of the court in favor of the action.
253. This was expressed by Alexander Bickel:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
system. There are various ways of sliding over this ineluctable reality. Marshall did
so when he spoke of enforcing, in behalf of "the people," the limits that they have
ordained for the institution of a limited government.... Marshall himself followed
Hamilton, who in the 78th Federalist denied that judicial review [was undemocratic].
"It only supposes," Hamilton went on, "that the power of the people is superior to
both [the courts and the Congress]; and that where the will of the legislature, de-
clared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Con-
stitution, the Judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former."
But the word "people" so used is an abstraction. Not necessarily a meaningless or
pernicious one by any means; always charged with emotion but nonrepresentational
- an abstraction obscuring the reality that when the Supreme Court declares uncon-
stitutional a legislative act,... [it] thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual
people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing major-
ity, but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actually happens ... and
it is the reason the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic.
A. BIcKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962).
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been built into the Constitution. More importantly, the FSLN does not
want the Supreme Court to have as much power as courts do in Western
countries because that power might enable justices to "frustrate" the rev-
olutionary process.
United States-style judicial review is certainly not a prerequisite for
democracy. The United Kingdom, to name the most obvious example,
functions quite well without it. Furthermore, the Nicaraguan Constitu-
tion is not viewed solely as a bulwark of individual freedom but rather
stresses some Communitarian goals not found in liberal Western consti-
tutions. Unfortunately, the problem is that in a country so dominated by
a single party, the Judiciary could prove to be the only institutional limi-
tation on FSLN power. The present Constitution does not seem to pro-
vide the Judiciary with that type of power.
2. The Independence of Judges
The First Draft of the Constitution did not stress the independence
of judges. It provided that the National Assembly elect judges for six-
year terms, 2 5 4 restricted the power of the Judiciary to certain cases, and
gave the mass organizations power to participate in the Judicial
Branch.255
The writers of the Second Draft attempted to provide for more in-
dependent judges, but they did not completely succeed. Although the
Second Draft did not provide lifetime tenure for judges, it did remove the
provision for six-year terms and left it to the National Assembly to de-
cide the length of the terms.256
The final draft of the Constitution reinstates six-year terms. 257 By
requiring even the Supreme Court justices to be reappointed, the Consti-
tution necessarily cuts down on the independence of judges and makes
the judges more responsive to the public's feelings about a case. The
National Assembly elects the Justices of the Supreme Court from a slate
254. First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, arts. 191-93.
255. Id. art. 189.
256. Federal judges in the United States are appointed for life and their salaries cannot be
decreased. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("Judges ... shall hold their Offices during good behavior,
and... [compensation] shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."), Life
tenure is presumed to remove judges from the political pressures of elected office and to allow
the judges to render decisions according to their conscience. See, e.g., THEB FEDERALIST, No.
78, supra note 10, at 228 (A. Hamilton) ("[The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence
over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society.... It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment .... ").
257. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 162.
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of candidates provided by the President.2 "8 The Justices of the Supreme
Court then appoint the lower court judges.25 9 This creates a self-select-
ing elite that could, and probably will, be based upon party loyalty,
which is inherently conservative (meaning only loyal party followers
would be selected). This increases the power of judges to limit change
within the Judiciary. It also limits the independence of the Judiciary be-
cause judges will be selected and continue in office only if they follow the
views of the majority of judges. Finally, the President apparently can
exercise some control over the Supreme Court by "packing" the
Court.2" The Constitution only states that the Court should have at
least seven justices; 26 1 it does not state a maximum. Presumably the
President can choose the number of Justices to sit on the Court.
The Justices of the Supreme Court enjoy immunity.262 The Consti-
tution specifically declares justices independent, rather than the Judici-
ary.263 This distinction is significant because it provides each Judge with
a constitutional claim to independence but does not protect the
institution.264
There is also a constitutional provision mandating popular partici-
pation in the Judiciary.265 It is not clear how the Sandinistas intend to
carry out this provision, but it certainly limits the independence of the
Judiciary.2 66 "Popular participation," at least at this time, is a code for
the policies of the FSLN, just as "mass organizations" is a code for
Sandinista organizations. It means that non-lawyers can have a role in
the Judiciary. It legitimizes a role for popular opinion as a factor injudi-
cial decision-making, a notion antithetical to western notions of an in-
258. Id, art. 165.
259. First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, art. 164(5). In the First Draft judges were to
be appointed "in accordance with the law."
260. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-6, at 580-81 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing Roosevelt's court-packing plan).
261. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 163.
262. Ia art. 162. The First Draft did not have this provision.
263. The First Draft made the Judiciary independent. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art.
161 ("Judges are independent and are subject only to the Constitution and the law.").
264. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 419 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("No
federal court exercising Art. III judicial power should be made a minion of any cabal that from
accidents of politics comes into the ascendancy. ..
265. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 166.
266. Cf 1978 CHINA CONsT., supra note 206, art. 41 ("In accordance with law, the Peo-
ple's courts apply the system whereby representatives of the masses participate as assessors in
administering justice."). Analyses of popular participation in other countries can be found in
Salas, The Judicial System of Post Revolutionary Cuba, 8 NOVA LJ. 43 (1983); Weiss, The
East German Social Courts" Developments and Comparison with China, 20 AM6ER. J. COMP. L
266 (1972); Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COL L. REv. 1317 (1969).
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
dependent judiciary.2 67 Finally, the provision appears to be antithetical
to the principle of legality stated in article 160.268 This provision rein-
forces the guiding constitutional statement that "D:Iustice emanates from
the people and shall be carried out in their name as their proxy by the
Judicial Branch. 2 69 Popular participation is a theme found throughout
the Constitution. The Vice President of Nicaragua has stated that
"[e]ffective democracy.., consists of ample popular participation....
[Flor us democracy is not merely a formal model, bat a continual process
capable of giving the people that elect and participate in it the real possi-
bility of transforming their lives."270 The Constitution stresses that citi-
zens should participate in all aspects of Nicaraguan life in order to
transform society.27'
The notion that justice emanates from the people is also interesting
because of its epistemological stance. In that definition of justice, "jus-
tice" is not tenable independent of the will of the people and, conversely,
justice cannot be counter to the will of the people.
In sum, although the Constitution purports to provide for an in-
dependent Judiciary, in practice the Judicial Branch and judges are se-
verely constrained in both the matters they can consider and the factors
they consider when deciding a case. This insures that the interests of the
Revolution are not compromised, a legitimate concern of the drafters in
light of the problems the old Judiciary carried with it.
3. Jurisdiction
a. The Pre-constitutional Judiciary
It was difficult for the Sandinistas to convince judges, especially
those educated under the Somoza regime, to break with their past and
invoke the spirit of the Revolution as an interpretive tool. As a result of
this difficulty the Sandinista Government tried to exclude certain types of
cases from the jurisdiction of the courts. This insured that justice ac-
cording to the goals of the Revolution was accomplished, regardless of
267. Cf Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a demo-
cratic society.").
268. Cf quote by Minister Borge, infra at note 291.
269. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 158.
270. Ruchwarger, The Sandinista Mass Organization and the Revolutionary Process 89, re-
printed in REVOLUTION UNDER SIEGE, supra note 29.
271. See, eg., NICAR. CONsT., supra note 3, arts. 48 (state must remove obstacles to cffec-
tive participation); 49 (right to form organizations to participate); 50 (effective participation
guaranteed); 81 (participation in work place management); 95 (participation in Army); 117
(education); and 166 (judiciary).
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the legality of such "justice." In a few situations the FSLN has felt so
strongly about the proper result in certain types of cases that it has cre-
ated separate tribunals to insure that revolutionary "justice" is done. In
those situations, the FSLN created special jurisdictional restrictions and
completely removed the Judiciary from hearing certain types of cases. 272
The first group of cases the Sandinistas removed from the courts con-
cerned the prosecution of crimes committed by members of Somoza's
National Guard, and political crimes committed by members of the
Somoza regime. The Junta issued a decree that created Special Tribunals
for the prosecution of crimes committed under the Somoza regime.3
These tribunals were placed outside the normal judicial system and were
not even staffed by lawyers.274 Those found guilty could not appeal to
the Judiciary,2 75 although certain officials could pardon them.276 The
conviction rate in these tribunals was an extremely high seventy-eight
percent.277 These tribunals were disbanded in February 1981 after hav-
ing completed all of their cases.278
Contras and other opponents of the Revolution are a second area of
concern for the FSLN. To deal with them, the Junta established the
Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals (TPAs).27 9 These tribunals, outside
the jurisdiction of the regular courts, had jurisdiction over crimes against
national security. Convicted Contras could neither appeal to the regular
courts, nor invoke habeas corpus. The TPA judges did not have to be
lawyers, and usually were not. Many international groups severely criti-
cized these tribunals for human rights violations, because they denied
due process to those charged with crimes28 ' that lacked any legal ba-
sis."' These tribunals denied the fundamental due process; however, the
272. Similar tactics have been attempted in the United States. See generally Sager, For-
ward Constitutional Limitations on Congress'Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 18 n.3 (1981) (describing a number of bills proposed in
Congress to strip courts of the power to decide issues like bussing or school prayer.).
273. Ley Creadora de los Tribunales Especiales, Decree No. 185 (Nov. 29, 1979).
274. Id. art. 8 (Members of the tribunals can be lawyers, law students or people of good
moral standing ["Ser persona de reconocida solvencia moral."]).
275. Id. arts. 19, 21.
276. Ley de Gracia, Decree No. 854 (Oct. 24, 1981).
277. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Nicaragua, INTER-AM.
C.H.R. 75, OEA/ser. L/V/II. 53, doc. 25, 75 (June 30, 1981) [hereinafter IACHR REPORT]
(6,310 prisoners were held. 1,760 were released due to pardons or dismissal of their cases, and
of the balance only 229 were acquitted while 4,331 were sentenced for 5 years or more.).
278. G. BLACK, supra note 98, at 238.
279. Ley de Tribunales Populares Anti-Somocitas, Decree No. 1233 (April 6, 1983).
280. See generally IACHR REPORT, supra note 277; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION oF HUMAN RIGHTS 1984-85, at 161-65.
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FSLN argued that this was necessary because during a state of emer-
gency such as the war with the Contras, the Government must be able to
deal firmly with dissent.282 The FSLN believed it was impossible for the
Judiciary, which was primarily appointed and trained under Somoza, to
judge members of that regime fairly. The most significant legal problem
of these tribunals was that there was no appeal to the regular court sys-
tem. The Government has since abolished the TPAs in order to comply
with the peace process.283
When the Government passed the initial Agrarian Reform Law it
also established special tribunals to monitor the Agrarian Reform.284
The Agrarian Tribunals had the power to resolve all disputes under the
law, and their ruling could not be appealed.285 The regular court system
was not considered sufficiently impartial to deal with the touchy issue of
land reform. Although the judges were generally sympathetic to Agra-
rian Reform, the FSLN feared that the upper middle 'class judges might
be put in the position of being forced to rule against their friends.
b. The Constitutional Judiciary
The pre-constitutional background of separate jurisdiction for polit-
ical crimes makes an examination of the structure of the Judiciary in the
Constitution particularly necessary. The First Draft would have allowed
separate tribunals to continue to operate under the Constitution because
military, agricultural, and state security matters were explicitly excluded
from the jurisdiction of the court system.286 The Second Draft excluded
only military matters from Supreme Court jurisdiction and seemed to
imply an end to the TPAs. 287 The Constitution allows for separate mili-
tary jurisdiction, but limits the possibilities of TPAs and other courts by
282. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944) (upholding the forced
detention and relocation of Japanese citizens during World War II). The Supreme Court justi-
fied this denial of civil rights by stating that "when under conditions of modern warfare our
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the
threatened danger." Id. at 220. See generally Hershey, Behind Barbed Wire, N.Y. TIMnS
MAG., Sept. 11, 1988, at 56 (describing Japanese concentration camps on the West coast of the
United States).
283. Nicar. Presidential Decrees, supra note 67, Decree No. 296.
284. Ley de Reforma Agraria ("Agrarian Reform Law of 1981"), Decree No. 782 (1981),
reprinted in PRINCIPALES LEYES APROBADAS, supra note 122. The Agrarian Reform and the
politics of agriculture in Nicaragua have been dealt with extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., D.
GILBERT, supra note 8, at ch. 4; REVOLUTION UNDER SIEGE, supra note 29, at oh. 2.
285. Ley de Reforma Agraria, reprinted in PRINCIPALES LEYES APROBADAS, supra note
22, arts. 27-29.
286. First Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 34, art. 196.
287. Second Draft, Nicar. Const., supra note 37, art. 156.
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requiring a single judiciary. However, the transitional constitutional pro-
vision allows Special Courts to continue to function until "they come
under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch."2 8 Because Nicaragua is
continually at war, individuals have been subject to the military courts
almost continually since the Revolution.
V. REVOLUTION IN THE CONSTITUTION
One problem with the dichotomy I have created between the legiti-
mation and limitation of the Party by the Constitution is that I have set
up a false equation. Throughout the Constitution, the Revolution is used
and acts as a supplement for the Party. The Constitution purports not to
deal with the Party and thus limits the power of the Party, and yet seems
to legitimate it. But the Constitution specifically institutionalizes the
Revolution and the text of the Constitution identifies the Revolution with
the Party. It is that institutionalization of the Revolution that will limit
the Judiciary's power to use the Constitution as a means of limiting the
power of the FSLN. This institutionalization of Revolution is considered
next. First, it will be looked at as an interpretative matter: What weight
should be given to the Revolution in interpreting the laws and the Con-
stitution? Second, as a theoretical matter: What does it mean to institu-
tionalize a revolution or revolutionary process in a constitution?
A. Constitutional Interpretation and the Revolution
Laws are not taken out of a magician's hat, and as long as we do
not have a corpus of revolutionary laws, we insist that we should inter-
pret each law under the guidance of the politics of the revolution...
because in the final analysis, laws, like guns, depend upon the political
consciousness of men.289
- Tomas Borge
The Constitution by its own terms attempts to create a "legal frame-
work to preserve and protect the Revolution." 2" In fact, President
Ortega has claimed that the Constitution not only incorporates the
Revolution but also "institutionalize[s] our revolutionary process. 291
288. NIcAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 199.
289. Speech by Tomas Borge, Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior, to the First Judicial
Congress on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Death of Sandino, in Managua, Nicaragua (Apr.
12, 1984), in LAWYERs COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 64, at 22.
290. Id. dedication.
291. Nicar. Presidential Decree., supra note 67, Decree No. 297 (speech by President
Daniel Ortega at Constitution Ceremony, in Managua, Nicaragua (Jan. 9, 1987)) (emphasis
added).
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References to the Revolution occur throughout the Constitution. The
Invocation mentions the heroes of the Revolution and revolutionary
struggle in general. The Constitution is dedicated to the Revolution.
The people have the right to defend the Revolution.292 The defense of
homeland and Revolution shall be directed by the state.293 The revolu-
tionary order established by the people requires the establishment of in-
ternal security to defend the Revolution.294
These passages raise questions about the status; of the Revolution in
interpreting the Constitution, and about the relationship between the ju-
diciary and the ideals of the Revolution. Although as a technical matter,
little weight can be given to provisions in the Preamble,295 it can provide
the interpretive spirit of the document.
The Preamble raises a number of difficult questions for the Judiciary
about the relationship between the Judiciary and the ideals of the
Revolution. First, when do the ideals of the Revolution (i.e., the intent
behind the Constitution stated in the Preamble, or more broadly, the pro-
nouncements of the FSLN) override the specific text of a pre-revolution-
ary law, even if the law remains otherwise "constitutional?" Second,
what if revolutionary ideals require that "justice" be enforced in such a
way that it runs counter to "technical" protections of the law? Third,
how can judges know which colonial laws are counter-revolutionary,
particularly when the judges were probably educated under the old re-
gime?296 Lastly, who determines how a law is "counter-revolutionary"?
Conflicts between "the law" and the spirit of the Revolution arise
constantly in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan Penal Code dates from 1884
(with substantial revisions in 1974),297 and the Nicaraguan Civil Code
292. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 93.
293. Id art. 94.
294. Id art. 97.
295. Many of the tensions that have been discussed in this Article stem from the constitu-
tional drafters' insistence that the Constitution creates a "legal framework to preserve and
protect the achievements of the Revolution." But as the text and others have made clear, the
FSLN is not institutionalizing the gains of the Revolution, but rather, as President Ortega
described it, "we are institutionalizing our revolutionary process." Nicar. Presidential Decrees,
supra note 67, Decree No. 297 (Speech by President Daniel Ortega at Constitutional Cere-
mony, in Managua, Nicaragua (Jan. 9, 1987)). The Preamble invokes language that honors
various aspects of the Revolution. These passages raise the question of the status of the
Revolution in interpreting the constitution.
296. Robert B. Seidman has noted that in post-revolutionary Zimbabwe former colonial
civil servants were not properly enforcing the laws of the new regime merely because they did
not understand the laws and not because they did not desire to support the law. Seidman,
Drafting for the Rule of Law: Maintaining Legality in Developing Countries, 12 YALE J, INT'L
L. 84 (1987).
297. LEY DEL C6DIGO PENAL DE NICARAGUA, 96 La Gaceta (1974).
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from 1904.298 These laws are clearly remnants of the colonial past. For
example, the Nicaraguan Penal Code punishes the stealing of a cow more
harshly than murder.299 The FSLN has argued for a new, more politi-
cally aware judicial method. It has urged that judges in Nicaragua
should interpret laws in light of the spirit of the Revolution rather than
according to letter of the law.3c° While discussing the role of the Judici-
ary in the transformation of Nicaraguan society, the Vice President of
the Nicaraguan Supreme Court said:
We are still operating largely under the same judicial system and
legal code that existed before the revolution. Some of these laws don't
correspond to today's conditions. At times, we are unable to make a
just ruling on a case, because the old laws protect and guarantee inter-
ests other than the ones that the revolution is now promoting....
[O]ur job is to guarantee that the revolution proceeds lawfully, but at
the same time we must recognize that some applications of the old
laws are incompatible with the revolutionary transformation that the
people support.301
This is particularly true with cases involving private property.302
The failure of judges to invoke "properly" the spirit of the Revolu-
tion has resulted in the dismissal of a small number of judges.0 3 The
position of judges in such situations is precarious. The Judiciary wants
both to protect individuals from the Government within the structure of
the laws and to further the Revolution. In Nicaragua the Judiciary has
ruled against the Government in some cases, but this is very unusual. 311
Other countries have had this same conflict.30 In December 1987, three
Supreme Court Judges resigned because of the failure of the Government
298. Teran, Aspects of the Evolution of Law in Sandinista Nicaragua, in CONFUCT iN Nic-
ARAGUA, supra note 13, at 61.
299. Compare Codigo Penal Arto. 128 with Arto. 272.
300. See, e.g., text accompanying note 2.
301. See, eg., Falk, Political Democracy in Nicaragua, 2 WORLD POL'Y J. 169 (1982) (an
interview with Vilma Nufiez de Escorcia, Vice President of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court).
302. Id. at 173.
303. LAWYERS COMM. REPORT, supra note 64, at 25.
304. See, eg., Falk, supra note 302, at 174.
305. Information on the history of the connections between revolutionary governments and
courts is hard to come by. One interesting article traces the relationship between the Supreme
Court and the military in Argentina. See Snow, Courts and Coups, reprinted in THE POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY OF LAw: A THaiR WORLD READER 262 (Y. Ghai, R. Luckman & F. Snyder
eds. 1987); see also Roberts, The Supreme Court in a Developing Society: Progressive or Reac-
tionary Force?, 20 AMER. 3. CoMp. L. 79 (1972)(discussing Maharaja Madhar Rao Scindia v.
Union of India (the Privy Purse Case), an Indian Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled
against the Government).
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to execute the orders of the Judiciary.306
The text of the Constitution provides some clues about how the doc-
ument should be read. The article that declares judges independent 0 7 is
qualified by the next sentence, which declares that judges "shall be gov-
erned by, among others, the principles of equality, public proceedings,
and the right to a defense."30 This provision severely limits the discre-
tion and independence of the Judiciary because judges are constitution-
ally required to consider these three factors in executing their duties,
rather than whatever factor they feel would be appropriate. 0 9
Even more significantly, the FSLN is closely identified with the
Revolution in both the text of the Constitution and in the public's per-
ceptions. Thus, interpreting the Constitution in light of the Revolution
might collapse into interpreting the Revolution in light of the FSLN.
B. The Paradox of a Revolutionary Constitution
The connection between the Revolution and the Constitution raises
a theoretical question in addition to technical and interpretive problems:
Is there such a thing as a revolutionary constitution? Although clearly
"post-revolutionary constitutions" (constitutions that codify and create a
government after a revolution) exist, a constitution that institutionalizes
a revolutionary process, rather than just the gains of a revolution, seems
paradoxical.
306. THE ECONOMIST, March 12, 1988, at 42.
307. NICAR. CONST., supra note 3, art. 165.
308. Id. At least one of the "other things" must be "gratitude," a word that was included
in the Second Draft but not the Final Draft. The only people for whom the Constitution
expresses gratitude are the various groups that struggled to bring about the Revolution, and
that could be the gratitude that the judges are supposed to keep in mind. If that is correct,
then "gratitude" would have the effect of limiting the Judiciary from making rulings against
the FSLN.
309. At least one writer has stressed that in socialist constitutions independence of the
Judiciary has a different meaning. Bothe notes:
The guaranty of the "independence" ofjudges in socialist constitutions does not have
the same meaning as in Western constitutions. The reasoning applied here is compa-
rable to that used in the definition of freedom explained previously: "Independence"
means that a judge is not executing the commands of the capitalist exploiting class
against social progress, but that he works in accordance with the laws of historical
development, thereby furthering progress. The provision that judges are only subject
to the constitution and the laws is to be interpreted in the light of the principle of
socialist legality:
The administration of justice serves the execution of socialist legality, the pro-
tection and development of the German Democratic Republic and its state and social
order. Art. 90(1) of the DDR Constitution.
Bothe, The 1968 Constitution of East Germany, 17 AM. J. CoMP. L. 268, at 281 (1969).
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The notion of a "revolutionary" constitution is strange and inher-
ently full of tension. As Louis Henkin noted:
Revolution and state-building are two different tasks, carried out in
wholly different moods.... A revolution defies authority, overthrows
government, is above the law. The constitution that follows reimposes
authority, provides legitimacy and a blueprint for new government, re-
stores law. Declarations of independence are the manifesto, the ideal,
the reach, constitutions are the grasp, the effort to realize the revolu-
tionary gain.310
The connection between legality and a revolution resists easy sum-
mary. Many countries have struggled with the legality of a revolution.
A host of problems surrounds the legitimacy of the government and the
"legality" of a revolution itself. Courts have tried to settle these difficult
questions.31' After the victory over Somoza by the FSLN, there was lit-
tie question that the FSLN had a legitimate right to form the new gov-
ernment of Nicaragua, but there was and is a significant question about
how they should go about it.
After a revolutionary government establishes its legal or de facto
authority, it must deal with the colonial or other prior legal structure.312
In general, the new government cannot completely abolish the former
legal system because such a measure would call into question current
structures and patterns of ownership and possibly result in chaos. Most
post-revolutionary constitutions contain a reception clause that main-
tains the previous legal structure.13 The Nicaraguan Constitution pro-
vides that "all aspects of the existing legal order that do not contradict
this Constitution shall remain in effect, until such time as they may be
modified.1 314
310. Henkin, Constitutional Fathers-Constitutional Sons, 60 M!NN. L REv. 1113, 1114(1976).
311. See, eg., Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, 1 A.C. 645 (1968) (legitimacy of the
Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence); see also State v. Dosso, P.LD. 1958 S.L
533 (Pakistan) (first case recognizing "a victorious revolution or successful coup d'etat [as] an
internationally recognized method of changing [a] Constitution."). The Supreme Court of Pak-
istan later criticizes Dosso in Asma Jilani v. Gov. of Punjab, P.L.D. 1972 S.C. 139; see also
Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons ex parte Matovu [1966] EA. 514.
312. This situation has come up often in newly independent countries. The conflict be-
tween past and future legal orders can arise in many circumstances, especially in former colo-
nies. The most obvious example of problems is property ownership. These problems can be
dealt with constitutionally or through legislation.
313. Reception clauses can be found, for example, in any state constitutions in the United
States retaining the law of England. Cf CUBA CONsT. art. 10 ("The Republic of Cuba rejects
and considers illegal and null all treaties, pacts and concessions which were signed in condi-
tions of inequality ... ").
314. NICAR. CoNsT., supra note 3, art. 198. But cf CUBA CONST. art. 10 ('The Republic
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On the other hand, the revolutionary government must make imme-
diate legal changes because the prior regime's values and goals are insti-
tutionalized in the existing legal and constitutional system. Thus the
FSLN abolished the old 1974 Constitution and expropriated the land
owned by the Somoza Family.
A constitution is by its nature conservative in that it legitimates the
power of the current government. While a constitution is an exercise of
state power, it also limits state power. Yet what happens when a revolu-
tionary government attempts to institutionalize and legitimate itself by
writing a new constitution? Such institutionalization of revolution is for-
mally paradoxical. The same document that legitimates the power of the
political government is supposed to be revolutionary for the people. A
constitution differs fundamentally from a revolution or a revolutionary
manifesto. It attempts to create legitimacy and authority, while a revolu-
tion seeks to overthrow them; a constitution creates the highest law,
while a revolution overthrows all law. There is inherent conflict when
revolutionary leaders draft a constitution. This potential contradiction
between revolution and constitutionalism has proved extremely difficult
for Nicaragua and other "revolutionary" countries. It is this central ten-
sion that underlies many of the "surface" tensions in the Nicaraguan
Constitution. This conflict is manifest structurally, in the role of the
FSLN and the structure of the branches of government, but it is also a
problem of interpretation: What is the role of the Revolution in inter-
preting the Constitution?
The institutionalization of the revolutionary process is particularly
difficult because it is ongoing. The forward looking aspects of the
Revolution are evident throughout the Constitution. Yet, is almost con-
tradictory for a constitution to be able to encompass the momentum of a
revolution.
The issue of a revolutionary constitution is the central contradiction
in the Nicaraguan Constitution. On one hand, the Constitution is "the
law" and must be respected. On the other hand, the ideals of the Revolu-
tion can "overrule" or override the law. By explicitly institutionalizing
the Revolution, the Sandinista seem to create an escape hatch from the
constraints of the Constitution and from the enforceability of any laws
that prove problematic. Fidel Castro has tried unsuccessfully to recon-
cile this contradiction:
In this revolutionary process there is a paradox characterized in
of Cuba rejects and considers illegal and null all treaties, pacts, amd concessions which were
signed in conditions of inequality. .. ").
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the first phase by iconoclasticism in relation to laws; we have to de-
stroy the system, destroy its laws, destroy everything. We now have
two truths: the first is that capitalist legality must be destroyed and the
second is that we must establish a socialist legality.
And to us revolutionaries corresponds this dual role of abolisher
of laws in one phase of the revolution and creators and defenders in
another phase of the revolution. And this is in agreement with another
law: the dialectic of history. So that we must all live in these very two
dialectical phases: destroying first and later creating. From the first
phase a certain illegal spirit which downgrades arises and this con-
tempt is also applied as well to revolutionary laws.
31 5
It is this central paradox that the FSLN must address if they seek to
establish any type of revolutionary constitutionalism. So far the Nicara-
guan Constitution seems to exhibit such a possibility, but it remains to be
seen how the Constitution will function in practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nicaraguan Constitution's conflicting ideas and provisions offer
a tangible, textual illustration of the difficulties of institutionalizing a
revolution. It is not possible definitively to explain or interpret the Con-
stitution. All I have attempted to do is begin the conversation about the
relevance of discontinuities and fissures in the "tissue" of official texts.
In doing so, I have explored the inevitable tension between a text and its
contexts, and between a revolution and a constitution.
315. Speech by Fidel Castro on the Tenth Anniversary of the Founding of the Ministry of
the Interior (June 13, 1971), quoted in Salas, supra note 266, at 69.
19881
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
APPENDIX
THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
hereby makes known to the people of Nicaragua that the Constituent
National Assembly after consulting with the people, has discussed and
approved the following Political Constitution:
PREAMBLE
WE,
The Representatives of the People of Nicaragua, united in the Constitu-
ent National Assembly,
INVOKE
The struggles of our Indian ancestors;
The spirit of Central American unity and the heroic tradition of our peo-
ple who, inspired by the exemplary actions of General JOSE DOLORES
ESTRADA, ANDRES CASTRO and ENMANUEL MONGALO, de-
stroyed the dominion of the filibusters and the United States intervention
in the National War;
BENJAMIN ZELEDON'S anti-interventionist deeds;
AUGUSTO C. SANDINO, General of Free People and Father of the
Popular and Anti-imperialist Revolution;
The heroic action of RIGOBERTO LOPEZ PEREZ, who initiated the
beginning of the end of the dictatorship;
The example of CARLOS FONSECA, the greatest perpetuator of
Sandino's legacy, founder of the Sandinista National Liberation Front
and Leader of the Revolution;
The generations of Heroes and Martyrs who forged and carried forward
the liberation struggle for national independence.
IN THE NAME OF
The Nicaraguan people; the democratic, patriotic and revolutionary
political parties and organizations of Nicaragua; the men and women;
the workers and peasants; the glorious youth; the heroic mothers; those
Christians who moved by their faith in GOD committed and dedicated
themselves to the struggle for the liberation of the oppressed; the patri-
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otic intellectuals; and all others who through their productive labor con-
tribute to the defense of the Nation;
Those who guarantee the happiness of future generations by offering
their lives in the struggle against imperialist aggression.
FOR
The establishment of the legal framework to protect and preserve the
achievements of the Revolution and the building of a new society dedi-
cated to the elimination of all forms of exploitation and to the achieve-
ment of economic, political and social equality for all Nicaraguans and
absolute respect for human rights.
FOR THE HOMELAND, FOR THE REVOLUTION, FOR THE
UNITY OF THE NATION AND FOR PEACE.
WE HEREBY PROCLAIM THE FOLLOWING POLITICAL CON-
STITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA
TITLE I
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER I
Art.1 Independence, sovereignty and self-determination are inaliena-
ble rights of the Nicaraguan people and the foundation of the
Nicaraguan nation. Any foreign interference in the internal
affairs of Nicaragua or any attempt to undermine these rights
is an attack upon the life of the people.
It is the right of the people and the duty of all citizens to pre-
serve and defend, with arms if necessary, the independence of
the Nation, its sovereignty and national self-determination.
Art.2 National sovereignty rests with the people, the source of all
power and forgers of their own destiny. The people exercise
democracy by freely deciding upon and participating in the
construction of the economic, political and social system
which best serves their interests. The people exercise power
both directly and through their representatives elected by uni-
versal suffrage; equal, free, and direct elections and secret
ballot.
Art.3 The struggle for peace and the establishment of a just world
order are unrenounceable national commitments of the Nica-
raguan nation. We therefore oppose all forms of colonialist
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and imperialist domination and exploitation. The Nicaraguan
people are in solidarity with all those who struggle against op-
pression and discrimination.
Art.4 The Nicaraguan people have created a new state to promote
their interests and guarantee their social and political achieve-
ments. The state is the principal instrument through which
the people eliminate all forms of exploitation and oppression,
promote material and spiritual progress of the nation, and en-
sure that the interests and rights of the majority prevail.
Art.5 The state guarantees the existence of political pluralism, a
mixed economy and non-alignment.
Political pluralism assures the existence and participation of all
political organizations in the economic, political and social af-
fairs of the nation, without ideological restrictions, except for
those who seek a return to the past or advocate the establish-
ment of a political system similar to it.
A mixed economy assures the existence of different forms of
property: public, private, associative, cooperative and commu-
nal; these forms of property must serve the best interests of the
nation and contribute to the creation of wealth to satisfy the
needs of the country and its inhabitants.
Nicaragua's international relations are based on the principle
of non-alignment, the search for peace, and respect for the sov-
ereignty of all nations; therefore, Nicaragua opposes all forms
of discrimination and is anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, and
anti-racist. Nicaragua rejects the subordination of any state by
another.
TITLE II
THE STATE
CHAPTER I
Art.6 Nicaragua is an independent, free, sovereign, unitary and indi-
visible state.
Art.7 Nicaragua is a participatory and representative democratic re-
public. It has four branches of government: Legislative, Exec-
utive, Judicial and Electoral.
Art.8 The people of Nicaragua are multi-ethnic and are an integral
part of the Central American nation.
Art.9 Nicaragua is a firm defender of Central American unity. It
supports and promotes all efforts to achieve political and eco-
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nomic integration and cooperation in Central America. It also
supports the efforts to establish and preserve peace in the
region.
Nicaragua, inspired by the ideals of Bolivar and Sandino,
strives for the unity of the people of Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Consequently, Nicaragua will participate with other Central
and Latin American countries in the creation and election of
the bodies necessary to achieve such goals. This principle shall
be regulated by appropriate legislation and treaties.
Art.10 The national territory is located between the Atlantic and Pa-
cific Oceans and the republics of Honduras and Costa Rica. It
includes the adjacent islands and keys, soil and subsoil, territo-
rial waters, continental platform, continental rise, airspace and
stratosphere.
The precise boundaries of the national territory are defined by
laws and treaties.
Art.l1 Spanish is the official language of the state. The languages of
the Communities of the Atlantic Coast shall also have official
use in the cases established by law.
Art.12 The city of Managua is the Capital of the Republic and the
seat of government. In exceptional circumstances these can be
established elsewhere in the nation.
Art.13 The symbols of the nation are the National Anthem, the Flag
and the Official Seal, as established by the law that defines their
characteristics and use.
Art.14 The state has no official religion.
TITLE m
NICARAGUAN NATIONALITY
CHAPTER I
Art. 15 Nicaraguans are either nationals or nationalized.
Art.16 Nationals are:
1. Those born in Nicaraguan territory, excepting children of
foreigners in diplomatic service, children of foreign offi-
cials serving international organizations or those sent by
their government to work in Nicaragua, unless they
choose to solicit Nicaraguan nationality;
2. Children of a Nicaraguan father or mother;
3. Children born abroad to fathers or mothers who originally
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were Nicaraguan, if and when they apply for citizenship
after reaching legal age or independence;
4. Infants of unknown parents found in Nicaragua, subject to
correction in accordance with the law should their filial
identity become known;
5. Children born to foreign parents on board a Nicaraguan
aircraft or vessel, if and when they solicit Nicaraguan
nationality.
Art. 17 Native born Central Americans who reside in Nicaragua have
the right to apply for Nicaraguan nationality from the compe-
tent authorities without renouncing their previous nationality.
Art. 18 The National Assembly may grant nationality to foreigners de-
serving this merit by virtue of extraordinary service rendered
to Nicaragua.
Art. 19 Foreigners who have renounced their nationality may be na-
tionalized by applying to the competent authorities when they
have fulfilled the requirements and conditions established by
law.
Art.20 No national may be deprived of nationality except upon volun-
tary acquisition of another; nor shall a national be deprived of
Nicaraguan nationality because of having acquired that of an-
other Central American country or any country with which
Nicaragua has an agreement of dual nationality.
Art.21 The granting, loss and recuperation of nationality shall be reg-
ulated by law.
Art.22 Cases of dual nationality shall be treated in conformity with
treaties and the principle of reciprocity.
TITLE IV
RIGHTS, DUTIES AND GUARANTEES OF THE
NICARAGUAN PEOPLE
CHAPTER I
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Art.23 The right to life is inviolable and inherent to all persons. There
is no death penalty in Nicaragua.
Art.24 All persons have duties to their families, the community, the
Homeland and humanity. The rights of each person are lim-
ited by the rights of others, the collective security and the just
requirements of the common good.
Art.25 All persons have the right to:
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1. personal freedom;
2. security;
3. seek legal redress.
Art.26 All persons have the right to:
1. privacy and the privacy of their family;
2. the inviolability of their home, correspondence and
communications;
3. respect for their honor and reputation.
A private home may be searched only with a warrant from a
competent judge or expressly authorized official to prevent a
crime from being committed or to avoid damage to persons or
goods, in accordance with the procedures established by law.
The law shall determine the cases and the procedures for an
examination of private documents, fiscal records and related
documents, when such is indispensable for the investigation of
matters before the Courts or for fiscal reasons.
Illegally seized letters, documents and other private papers
shall be null and void in legal proceedings or elsewhere.
Art.27 All persons are equal before the law and have the right to
equal protection under the law. There shall be no discrimina-
tion for reasons of birth, nationality, political belief, race, gen-
der, language, religion, opinion, national origin, economic
position or social condition.
Foreigners have the same rights and duties as Nicaraguans,
with the exception of political rights and other rights estab-
lished by law; foreigners may not intervene in the political af-
fairs of the country.
The state respects and guarantees the rights recognized in this
Constitution to all persons who are in Nicaraguan territory
and subject to its jurisdiction.
Art.28 Nicaraguans who are temporarily out of the country have the
right to enjoy amparo3l 6 and protection by the state through
its diplomatic representatives.
Art.29 All persons have the right to freedom of conscience and
thought and to profess or not to profess a religion. No one
shall be the object of coercive measures which diminish these
rights, or be obligated to declare his or her creed, ideology or
beliefs.
316. In Nicaragua, "amparo" is a legal procedure used to seek review of administrative
acts, similar to the writs of prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus in the United States
judicial system. It is originally a Mexican constitutional concept.
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Art.30 Nicaraguans have the right to freely express their beliefs in
public or private, individually or collectively, in oral, written
or any other form.
Art.31 Nicaraguans have the right to travel and to establish their resi-
dence in any part of the nation and to freely enter and exit the
country.
Art.32 No one is obligated to do what is not required by law, or
barred from doing what is not prohibited by law.
Art.33 No one may be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, or be de-
prived of liberty except in cases established by law and in ac-
cordance with legal procedures. Therefore:
1. An individual may be detained only by a warrant issued
from a competent Judge or an official expressly authorized
by law, except when apprehended in the act of committing
a crime;
2. All detained persons have the right to be:
2.1. Informed in detail without delay of the reasons for
their detention and the charges against them, in a
language they understand; to have their family in-
formed; and to be treated with respect in accordance
with the dignity inherent in human beings;
2.2. Brought before a competent legal authority within
72 hours;
3. No one shall be detained after a release order has been
granted by the appropriate authority or once the sentence
imposed has been completed;
4. The responsible authority shall be liable for any illegal
detention;
5. The appropriate authorities shall attempt to maintain
those awaiting trial apart from those who have been
sentenced.
Art.34 All those awaiting trial have equal rights to the following mini-
mum guarantees:
1. To be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to
the law;
2. To be tried without undue delay by a competent court
established by law;
3. Not to be removed from the jurisdiction of a competent
judge except in cases provided for in this Constitution or
by law;
4. To be guaranteed the right to a defense, to participate
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personally from the start of the proceedings and to ade-
quate time and means to prepare their defense;
5. To be represented by a public defender when legal coun-
sel has not been selected by the time of the first hearing,
or in the event that no prior call was decreed;
The accused shall have the right to communicate freely
and in private with his or her legal counsel;
6. To have the assistance of an interpreter free of charge if
they do not understand or speak the language used by the
court;
7. Not to be obligated to testify against themselves or
against a spouse or a partner in a stable de facto union, or
a family member within the fourth level of consanguinity
or the second of marital relations, or to admit their own
guilt;
8. To be found guilty or not guilty within the legal time pe-
riod, by each of the relevant courts;
9. To have the tight to appeal to a superior court upon con-
viction of any crime and not to be retried for any crime
for which a final judgement of conviction or acquittal has
been issued;
10. Not to be brought to trial or sentenced for acts or omis-
sions which at the time committed had not been unequiv-
ocally established by law as a punishable crime, and not
to be given a sentence which has not been previously es-
tablished by law.
Criminal proceedings are open to the public, but in some
cases the press and the general public may be excluded
for moral considerations or for matters of the public or-
der or national security.
Art.35 Minors shall not be subjected to nor the object of judgment,
nor shall they be submitted to any legal proceeding. Minors
who violate the law cannot be taken to penal rehabilitation
centers. They shall be attended in centers under the responsi-
bility of a specialized institution, as provided by law.
Art.36 All persons shall have the tight to respect for their physical,
psychological and moral integrity. No one shall be subjected
to torture, nor inhumane, cruel or degrading treatment. Viola-
tion of this tight constitutes a crime and shall be punishable by
law.
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Art.37 The penalty shall not extend beyond the accused. No sentence
may independently or consecutively total more than thirty
years.
Art.38 The law is not retroactive except in penal matters that favor
the accused.
Art.39 In Nicaragua the Penitentiary System is humane, its funda-
mental objective is to transform the detainee into a person ca-
pable of reintegration into the society. In the progressive
stages, the Penitentiary System shall promote family unity,
health care, educational and cultural advancement and pro-
ductive occupation with financial compensation. Detention has
a reeducational character.
Women and men serving prison sentences shall be held in sepa-
rate penal centers. Women shall be provided guards of the
same sex.
Art.40 No one shall be subjected to involuntary servitude. Slavery
and slave trade in any form are prohibited.
Art.41 No one shall be detained for indebtedness. This principle does
not limit the powers of competent legal authorities to issue
warrants for the non-fulfillment of support or alimony orders.
All national and foreign citizens have the duty to pay their
debts.
Art.42 Nicaragua guarantees asylum to those persecuted for their
struggle for democracy, peace, justice and human rights.
The granting of political asylum shall be determined by law in
accordance with international agreements ratified by Nicara-
gua. If a political refugee or exile is expelled from Nicaragua,
that person may not be sent back to the country in which he or
she was persecuted.
Art.43 Extradition from Nicaragua will not be permitted for political
crimes or common crimes committed in conjunction with
them, at Nicaragua's own discretion. Extradition for other
common crimes is regulated by law and International Treaties.
Nicaraguans shall not be extradited from Nicaragua.
Art.44 Nicaraguans have the right to the personal property and neces-
sary goods that are essential for the integral development of
each person.
Art.45 Persons whose constitutional rights have been violated or are
in danger of violation have the right to present writs of habeas
corpus or amparo, according to the circumstances and the Law
of Amparo.
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Art.46 All persons in Nicaragua shall enjoy protection and recogni-
tion by the state of the rights inherent to human beings, as well
as unrestricted respect, promotion and protection of human
rights, and the full benefit of the rights set forth in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights; the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man; the International Pact of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
Pact of Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations; and
the American Convention of Human Rights of the Organiza-
tion of American States.
CHAPTER II
POLITICAL RIGHTS
Art.47 All Nicaraguans who have reached 16 years of age are full
citizens.
All citizens enjoy the political rights set forth in the Constitu-
tion and in other laws, without limitations other than those
established for reasons of age.
A citizen's rights may be suspended when serious corporal or
specific related punishments are applied and when a final judg-
ment of civil injunction is decreed.
Art.48 Unconditional equality among Nicaraguans in the enjoyment
of political rights is established. In the exercise of these rights
and in the fulfillment of these responsibilities and obligations,
there exists absolute equality between men and women. It is
the obligation of the state to remove obstacles that impede ef-
fective participation of Nicaraguans in the political, economic
and social life of the country.
Art.49 In Nicaragua workers in the cities and countryside, women,
youth, agricultural producers, artisans, professionals, techni-
cians, intellectuals, artists, religious persons, the Communities
of the Atlantic Coast and the population in general have the
right to form organizations in order to realize their aspirations
according to their own interests, without discrimination, and
to participate in the construction of a new society.
Such organizations may be formed by the voluntary participa-
tion and free will of their members. They shall have a social
function and may have a partisan character, according to their
nature and objectives.
Art.50 Citizens have the right to participate under equal conditions in
public affairs and in state management.
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Effective participation by the people at local and national
levels shall be guaranteed by law.
Art.51 Citizens have the right to elect and be elected in periodic elec-
tions, and to vie for public office.
Art.52 Citizens have the right, individually or collectively, to petition,
to denounce irregularities and to make constructive criticisms
to the branches of government or to any authority, and to ob-
tain a quick resolution or response and to have the result made
known within the time period established by law.
Art.53 The right to peaceful assembly is recognized; the exercise of
this right does not require prior permission.
Art.54 The right to public assembly, demonstration and mobilization
in conformity with the law is recognized.
Art.55 Nicaraguan citizens have the right to organize or affiliate with
political parties with the objective of participating in, exercis-
ing or vying for power.
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL RIGHTS
Art.56 The state shall grant special attention in all of its programs to
those who defend the dignity, honor and sovereignty of the na-
tion, and to their families, as well as to the families of those
fallen in defense of the nation, in accordance with the laws.
Art.57 Nicaraguans have the right to work in keeping with human
nature.
Art.58 Nicaraguans have the right to education and culture.
Art.59 Every Nicaraguan has an equal right to health care. The state
shall establish the basic conditions for the promotion, protec-
tion, recuperation and *rehabilitation of the health of the
people.
The organization and direction of health care programs, serv-
ices and activities is the responsibility of the state, which shall
also promote popular participation in support of health care.
Citizens are obliged to respect stipulated sanitary measures.
Art.60 Nicaraguans have the right to live in a healthy environment
and it is the obligation of the state to preserve, conserve and
reclaim the environment and the natural resources of the
country.
Art.61 The state guarantees Nicaraguans the right to social security
for protection against the social contingencies of life and work,
in the manner and conditions determined by law.
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Art.62 The state shall strive to establish programs for the physical,
psycho-social and professional rehabilitation of disabled peo-
ple, and for their job placement.
Art.63 It is the right of all Nicaraguans to be protected against hun-
ger. The state shall promote programs which assure adequate
availability and equitable distribution of food.
Art.64 Nicaraguans have the right to decent, comfortable and safe
housing that guarantees familial privacy. The state shall pro-
mote the fulfillment of this right.
Art.65 Nicaraguans have the right to sports, physical education, re-
laxation and recreation. As part of their integral development,
the state shall promote sports and physical education, through
the organized and mass participation of the people and specific
programs and projects.
Art.66 Nicaraguans have the right to accurate information. This
right includes the freedom to seek, receive and disseminate in-
formation and ideas, be they spoken or written, in graphic or
any other form.
Art.67 The right to provide information is a social responsibility and
shall be exercised with strict respect for the principles estab-
lished in the Constitution. This right cannot be subject to cen-
sorship, but may be subject to retroactive liability established
by law.
Art.68 The mass media is at the service of national interests. The
state shall promote the access of the public and its organiza-
tions to the means of communication, and shall prevent the
media from responding to foreign interests or to any economic
power monopoly.
The existence and functioning of public, corporate or private
means of communication shall not be the object of prior cen-
sorship. It shall be subject to the law.
Art.69 All persons, either individually or collectively, have the right
to practice their religion in public or private, through worship,
practice and teaching.
No one may disobey the law or prevent others from exercising
their rights and fulfilling their duties by invoking religious be-
liefs or inclination.
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CHAPTER IV
FAMILY RIGHTS
Art.70 The family is the fundamental nucleus of society and has the
right to protection by society and the state.
Art.71 It is the right of Nicaraguans to form a imily. The law shall
regulate and protect this right.
Art.72 Marriage and stable de facto unions are protected by the state;
they rest on the voluntary agreement between a man and a
woman, and may be dissolved by mutual consent or by the will
of one of the parties, as provided by law.
Art.73 Family relations rest on respect, solidarity and absolute equal-
ity of rights and responsibilities between the man and woman.
Parents must work together to maintain the home and provide
for the integral development of their children, with equal
rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, children are obli-
gated to respect and assist their parents. These duties and
rights shall be fulfilled in accordance with the pertinent
legislation.
Art.74 The state grants special protection to the process of human
reproduction.
Women shall have special protection during pregnancy and
shall be granted maternity leave with pay and appropriate so-
cial security benefits.
No one may deny employment to women for reasons of preg-
nancy nor dismiss them during pregnancy or the post-natal pe-
riod, in conformity with the law.
Art.75 All children have equal rights. There shall be no discrimina-
tion for reasons of filial relations. In ordinary legislation, dis-
positions or classifications that reduce or deny equality among
children shall be null and void.
Art.76 The state shall promote programs and develop special centers
for the care of minors; minors have the right to protection and
education from their family, the society and the state, accord-
ing to their needs.
Art.77 The elderly have the right to protective measures from their
family, society and the state.
Art.78 The state shall protect responsible paternity and maternity and
establish the right to investigate paternity and maternity.
Art.79 The right of adoption based on the best interests of the child is
established, as regulated by law.
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CHAFTER V
LABOR RIGHTS
Art.80 Work is a right and a social responsibility. The labor of Ni-
caraguans is the fundamental means to satisfy the needs of so-
ciety and of the individual, and is the source of the wealth and
prosperity of the nation. The state shall strive for full and pro-
ductive employment under conditions that guarantee the fun-
damental rights of the individual.
Art.81 Workers have the right to participate in the management of
their enterprises, through their organizations and in conform-
ity with the law.
Art.82 Workers have the right to working conditions that guarantee:
1. Equal pay for equal work under identical conditions, suita-
ble to their social responsibility, without discrimination for
political, religions, social, gender or other reasons, which
assures a standard of living compatible with human
dignity;
2. Payment of legal tender in their work place;
3. Minimum wage and social security payment shall not be
legally attached except for support of the family and only
by the terms established by law;
4. Work conditions that guarantee physical safety, health
and hygiene and minimize work hazards to guarantee the
worker's occupational health and safety;
5. An eight-hour work day, weekly rest, vacations, remuner-
ation for national holidays and a thirteenth month bonus,
in conformity with the law;
6. Work stability in conformity with the law and equal op-
portunity to be promoted, subject to length of service, ca-
pacity, efficiency and responsibility;
7. Social security for protection and subsistence in case of
disability, old age, occupational hazards, illness or mater-
nity; and for family members in case of death, according to
the conditions established by law.
Art.83 The right to strike is recognized.
Art.84 Child labor that can affect normal childhood development or
interfere with the obligatory school year is prohibited. Chil-
dren and adolescents shall be protected against any form of
economic or social exploitation.
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Art.85 Workers have the right to cultural, scientific and technical de-
velopment; the state shall facilitate this through special
programs.
Art.86 All Nicaraguans have the right to choose and exercise freely
their profession or trade and to choose their place of work with
no requirements other than requisite schooling and that the
work serve a social purpose.
Art.87 Full labor union freedom exists in Nicaragua. Workers may
organize voluntarily in unions, which shall be constituted in
conformity with the law.
No workers are obligated to belong to a particular union, nor
to resign from the one to which they belong. Full union auton-
omy is recognized and the legal rights of organized labor are
respected.
Art.88 In defense of their individual or organizational interests, work-
ers are guaranteed the inalienable right to negotiate with their
employers, in conformity with the law:
1. Individual contracts;
2. Collective bargaining agreements.
CHAPTER VI
RIGHTS OF THE COMMUNITIES OF THE
ATLANTIC COAST
Art.89 The Communities of the Atlantic Coast are indivisible parts of
the Nicaraguan people, enjoy the same rights and have the
same obligations as all Nicaraguans.
The Communities of the Atlantic Coast have the right to pre-
serve and develop their cultural identities within the frame-
work of national unity, to be granted their own forms of social
organization, and to administer their local affairs according to
their traditions.
The state recognizes the communal forms of land ownership of
the Communities of the Atlantic Coast and their enjoyment,
use and benefit of the waters and forests of these communal
lands.
Art.90 The Communities of the Atlantic Coast have the right to the
free expression and preservation of their languages, art and
culture. The development of their culture and values enriches
the national culture. The state shall crea:e special programs to
enhance the exercise of these rights.
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Art.91 The state is obligated to enact laws promoting and assuring
that no Nicaraguan shall be the object of discrimination for
reasons of language, culture or origin.
TITLE V
NATIONAL DEFENSE
CHAPTER I
Art.92 It is the duty and right of Nicaraguans to struggle for the de-
fense of life, Homeland, justice and peace for the full develop-
ment of the nation.
Art.93 The Nicaraguan people have the right to arm themselves in
defense of their sovereignty, independence and revolutionary
gains. It is the duty of the state to direct, organize and arm the
people to guarantee this right.
Art.94 The defense of the Homeland and the Revolution rests on the
mobilization and organized participation of all the people in
the struggle against their aggressors. The state shall promote
mass incorporation of the people into the various structures
and tasks of the country's defense.
Art.95 The Sandinista Popular Army has a national character and
must protect, respect and obey this Political Constitution.
The Sandinista Popular Army is the military arm of the people
and direct descendant of the Army in Defense of National Sov-
ereignty. The state prepares, organizes and directs popular
participation in the armed defense of the Homeland through
the Sandinista Popular Army.
No armed groups may exist in the national territory other than
those established by the law, which shall regulate military or-
ganizational structure.
Art.96 Nicaraguans have the duty to bear arms to defend the Home-
land and the gains of the people against the threats and aggres-
sions of a foreign country, or of forces directed or supported by
any country. Patriotic Military Service is established in ac-
cordance with the terms of the law.
Art.97 The struggle against externally promoted actions to undermine
the revolutionary order established by the Nicaraguan people
and the confrontation with criminal and anti-social actions are
integral to the defense of the Revolution. The state creates the
internal security forces, whose functions are determined by
law.
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TITLE VI
NATIONAL ECONOMY, AGRARIAN REFORM
AND PUBLIC FINANCES
CHAPTER I
NATIONAL ECONOMY
Art.98 The principal economic function of the state is to promote the
country's material development, overcome the inherited back-
wardness and dependence of the economy, improve the coun-
try's standard of living and create a more just distribution of
wealth.
Art.99 The state directs and plans the national economy to guarantee
the protection of the interests of the majority and the promo-
tion of socio-economic progress.
The Central Bank, the National Financial System, Insurance
and Foreign Commerce, instruments of the economic system,
are irrevocable responsibilities of the state.
Art.100 The state shall promulgate a Foreign Investment Law that
contributes to the socio-economic development of the country,
without damaging national sovereignty.
Art.101 Workers and other productive sectors have the right to partici-
pate in the creation, execution and control of economic plans.
Art. 102 Natural resources are national patrimony. Preservation of the
environment, and conservation, development and rational ex-
ploitation of natural resources are responsibilities of the state;
the state may formalize contracts for the rational exploitation
of these resources when required by the national interest.
Art. 103 The state guarantees the democratic coexistence of public, pri-
vate, cooperative, associative and communal property; all these
form parts of the mixed. economy, are subject to the overriding
interests of the nation and fulfill a social function.
Art. 104 Enterprises organized under any of the forms of ownership es-
tablished in this Constitution enjoy equality before the law and
the economic policies of the state. The economic plans of en-
terprises must be prepared with the participation of the work-
ers. Free economic initiative exists.
Art. 105 The state is obligated to fairly and rationally regulate the sup-
ply and distribution of basic consumer goods, both in the coun-
tryside and in the cities. Speculation and hoarding are
incompatible with the socio-economic system and constitute
serious crimes against the people.
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CHAPTER II
AGRARIAN REFORM
Art. 106 Agrarian reform is the fundamental instrument for achieving a
just distribution of land and an effective means for revolution-
ary transformation, national development and the social pro-
gress of Nicaragua. The state guarantees the development of
the agrarian reform program, to fulfill the historic demands of
the peasants.
Art.107 Agrarian reform shall abolish landed estates, rentism, ineffi-
cient production and the exploitation of peasants. It shall pro-
mote forms of ownership compatible with the economic and
social objectives of the nation, as established in this
Constitution.
Art. 108 Land ownership is guaranteed to all those who productively
and efficiently work their land. The law shall establish specific
regulations and exceptions in conformity with the goals and
objectives of agrarian reform.
Art.109 The state shall promote the voluntary association of peasants
in agricultural cooperatives, without sexual discrimination.
Subject to -resources, it shall provide the material means neces-
sary to raise their technical and productive capacity in order to
improve the standard of living of the peasants.
Art.110 The state shall promote the voluntary incorporation of small
and medium scale agricultural producers, both individually
and in associations, into the economic and social development
plans of the country.
Art.ll1 The peasants and other productive sectors have the right to
participate, through their own organizations, in establishing
the policies of agrarian transformation.
CHAPTER III
PUBLIC FINANCES
Art.112 The annual General Budget of the Republic shall regulate pub-
lic income and expenditure. The Budget must show the dis-
tinct sources and recipients of income and expenditure, which
must balance, and shall determine the spending limits of the
state institutions. Extraordinary spending may only be author-
ized by law and financed through the simultaneous creation
and assignment of resources.
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Art. 113 The Budget shall be prepared by the President of the Republic
and approved by the National Assembly in the Annual Budget
Law, in conformity with this Constitution and the law.
Art. 114 The taxation system must take into consideration the distribu-
tion of wealth and income, as well as the needs of the state.
Art. 115 Taxes must be created by laws that establish their frequency
and type and the rights of taxpayers. The state shall not re-
quire payment of taxes that have not been previously estab-
lished by law.
TITLE VII
EDUCATION AND CULTURE
CHAPTER I
Art. 116 Education seeks the full and integral development of Ni-
caraguans; to stimulate them with a critical, scientific and hu-
manist way of thinking; to develop their personality and sense
of dignity and to prepare them to assume the tasks of common
interest necessary for the progress of the nation. Therefore,
education is fundamental to the transformation and develop-
ment of the individual and society.
Art. 117 Education is a single, democratic, creative and participatory
process, which promotes scientific research and links theory
with practice and manual with intellectual labor. It is based
on our national values; on the knowledge of our history and
reality and of national and universal culture; and on scientific
and technological advances; it cultivates the values of the new
Nicaraguan in accord with the principles established in this
Constitution, the study of which must be promoted.
Art. 118 The state promotes the participation of the family, community
and individuals in education and guarantees the support of the
public means of communication for this purpose.
Art. 119 Education is an unrenounceable responsibility of the state, in-
cluding planning, direction and organization. The national ed-
ucational system functions in an integrated fashion and in
accordance with national plans. Its organization and function-
ing are determined by law.
It is the duty of the state to develop and train the technical and
professional personnel at all levels and disciplines necessary for
the development and transformation of the country.
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Art. 120 The creative application of educational plans and policies is a
fundamental role of the national teaching profession. Teachers
have the right to living and working conditions in accord with
their dignity and with the important social function that they
perform; they shall be promoted and given incentives in accord
with the law.
Art.121 All Nicaraguans have free and equal access to education. Ba-
sic education is free of charge and obligatory. The Communi-
ties of the Atlantic Coast have access in their region to
education in their native language up to the levels set by na-
tional plans and programs.
Art.122 Adults shall be offered educational opportunities and training
programs. The state shall continue its programs to eradicate
illiteracy.
Art.123 Private education centers may function at all levels, subject to
the terms established in this Constitution.
Art.124 Education in Nicaragua is secular. The state recognizes the
right of private educational centers with a religious orientation
to teach religion as an extracurricular subject.
Art.125 Higher education enjoys financial, organic and administrative
autonomy in accordance with the law. Academic freedom is
recognized. The state promotes free creation, research and dis-
semination of the sciences, arts and letters.
Art.126 It is the duty of the state to promote the recovery, development
and strengthening of national culture, sustained by creative
popular participation.
The state shall support national culture in all its diversity,
whether collective or individual.
Art.127 Artistic and cultural creation is completely unrestricted. Cul-
tural workers have full freedom to choose their forms and
styles of expression. The state shall strive to provide them
with the means necessary to create and present their works,
and to protect their rights of authorship.
Art. 128 The state protects the archeological, historical, linguistic, cul-
tural and artistic patrimony of the nation.
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TITLE VIII
ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Art.129 The Legislative, Executive, Judicial and Electoral branches of
government are independent of one another and coordinate
harmoniously, subject only to the overriding national interest
and to the provisions established in this Constitution.
Art.130 No office holder may exercise functions other than those con-
ferred upon the office by the Constitution and the laws.
All state officials must declare their financial status before as-
suming and upon leaving public office, as regulated by law.
Art. 131 Elected and appointed officials of the four branches of govern-
ment are publicly accountable for the proper fulfillment of
their duties and must inform the public of their work and offi-
cial activities. They must be receptive to problems presented
by the people and strive to resolve them. Official duties must
be exercised in the public interest. All officials must efficiently
and honestly carry out their duties; they shall be responsible
for their acts and omissions. Civil service shall be regulated by
law.
CHAPTER II
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Art. 132 The National Assembly exercises legislative power through
representative popular mandate. The National Assembly is
composed of ninety Representatives with their respective Al-
ternates, elected by universal suffrage; equal, free and direct
elections, and secret ballot in regional districts by means of a
proportional representation system, as regulated by the Electo-
ral Law. The number of Representatives may be increased in
accord with the general census of the population in conformity
with the law.
Art. 133 Unelected Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who
participated in the election also form part of the National As-
sembly as Representatives and Alternates respectively if they
have received a number of votes equal or superior to the aver-
age number of votes necessary to win the election in each re-
gional electoral district.
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Art.134 A Representative in the National Assembly must be:
1. A Nicaraguan national;
2. In full enjoyment of political and civil rights;
3. Over twenty-one years of age.
Art.135 No Representative to the National Assembly may obtain any
concessions from the state or be the proxy or agent of public,
private or foreign enterprises which have contracts with the
state. Violation of this provision annuls the concessions or ad-
vantages obtained and terminates the person's representative
status.
Art.136 Representatives to the National Assembly shall be elected for a
period of six years, starting from the date of inauguration,
which shall be the ninth of January of the year following the
election.
Art.137 Representatives and Alternates elected to the National Assem-
bly shall be sworn in by the President of the Supreme Electoral
Council.
The National Assembly shall be inaugurated by the Supreme
Electoral Council.
Art.138 The functions of the National Assembly are to:
1. Draft and approve laws and decrees, as well as amend or
repeal existing ones;
2. Officially interpret the law;
3. Decree amnesty and pardons, as well as commute or re-
duce sentences;
4. Solicit reports through the President of the Republic
from the Ministers or Vice Ministers of the state, and
Presidents or Directors of autonomous and governmental
institutions. Request by the same means their personal
appearance and explanation or consultation;
5. Grant and cancel legal status to entities of a civil or reli-
gious nature;
6. Consider, discuss and approve the General Budget of the
Republic in conformity with the procedures established
in the Constitution and by law;
7. Elect Judges to the Supreme Court of Justice, and Mem-
bers and their Alternates to the Supreme Electoral Coun-
cil, from slates of three candidates proposed by the
President of the Republic;
8. Elect the Controller General of the Republic from a slate
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of three candidates proposed by the President of the
Republic;
9. Consider, acknowledge and decide on the resignations or
permanent absences of Representatives to the National
Assembly;
10. Consider and acknowledge the resignations or dismissals
of Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice, of Members of
the Supreme Electoral Council or the Controller General
of the Republic;
11. Ratify or reject international treaties;
12. Regulate all matters related to symbols of the nation;
13. Create honorary orders and distinctions of national
character;
14. Create and grant its own orders of national character;
15. Receive the President or the Vice President of the Repub-
lic in formal session to hear the annual report;
16. Delegate the legislative faculties to the President of the
Republic when the National Assembly is in recess, in ac-
cord with the Annual Decree of Delegating Legislative
Functions. Matters relating to the codes of the Republic
are excepted;
17. Elect the National Assembly's Executive Board;
18. Create permanent, special and research committees;
19. Propose grace pensions and grant honors for distin-
guished service to the Homeland and to humanity;
20. Determine the political and administrative division of the
country;
21. Consider the nation's economic and social development
plans and policies;
22. Fill permanent vacancies of the Presidency or Vice Presi-
dency of the Republic;
23. Authorize foreign visits of the President of the Republic
which last longer than one month;
24. Review and resolve complaints presented against officials
who enjoy immunity;
25. Decree the General Statute and Internal Rules of the Na-
tional Assembly;
26. Fulfill other functions conferred by the Constitution and
the laws.
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Art.139 Representatives shall bear no legal responsibility for their opin-
ions and votes cast in the National Assembly and enjoy immu-
nity in conformity with the law.
Art.140 Representatives to the National Assembly and the President of
the Republic may initiate bills, as may the Supreme Court of
Justice and the Supreme Electoral Council in matters pertain-
ing to their respective jurisdictions. This right of initiative
shall be regulated by the General Statute and Internal Rules of
the National Assembly.
Art.141 Quorum for sessions of the National Assembly is half the
number of its members plus one. To be approved, bills shall
require a favorable vote by a simple majority of the Represent-
atives present.
Once a bill is approved, it shall be sent to the President of the
Republic for authorization, promulgation and publication.
Art.142 The President of the Republic may partially or totally veto a
bill within 15 days after receiving it. If the President does not
veto the bill, and fails to authorize, promulgate and publish it,
the President of the National Assembly shall order the law to
be published.
Art. 143 A bill partially or totally vetoed by the President of the Repub-
lic must be returned to the National Assembly with the rea-
sons for the veto specified. The National Assembly can reject
the veto with a vote of half its Representatives plus one, in
which case the President of the National Assembly shall order
the law to be published.
CHAPTER i'I
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Art. 144 The President of the Republic, who is the Head of State, Head
of Government and Commander in Chief of the Defense and
Security Forces of the Nation, exercises executive power.
Art.145 The Vice President of the Republic carries out the functions
delegated by the President and shall substitute in that position
during the President's temporary or permanent absence.
Art.146 The election of the President and Vice President of the Repub-
lic is by equal, direct, free universal suffrage in secret ballot.
The Candidates who receive the largest number of votes will be
elected.
Art.147 The President and Vice President of the Republic must be:
1. Nicaraguan nationals;
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2. In full enjoyment of civil and political rights;
3. Over twenty-five years of age.
Art. 148 The President and Vice President shall exercise their functions
for a period of six years, starting from their inauguration on
January 10 of the year following the election; they shall enjoy
immunity during their term of office.
Art. 149 In case of the temporary absence of the President of the Re-
public, the Vice President shall assume the Presidential func-
tions. When the absence is permanent, the Vice President shall
assume the position of the President of the Republic for the
remainder of the term and the National Assembly must elect a
new Vice President.
In case of the temporary and simultaneous absence of the Pres-
ident and Vice President, the President of the National Assem-
bly, or whoever is serving in that position in accord with the
law, shall assume the functions of the President. In case of the
permanent absence of the Vice President of the Republic, the
National Assembly shall appoint a substitute.
If the President and Vice President of the Republic are perma-
nently absent, the President of the National Assembly or who-
ever is next in order of succession under law shall assume the
functions of the President. The National Assembly must ap-
point substitutes for the President and Vice President within
seventy-two hours after their positions have become vacant.
Those appointed shall exercise their functions for the remain-
der of the term.
Art. 150 The functions of the President of the Republic are to:
1. Comply with and enforce the Political Constitution and
the laws;
2. Represent the nation;
3. Initiate legislation and exercise the right to veto, in ac-
cordance with this Constitution;
4. Enact executive decrees with the force of law in fiscal and
administrative matters;
5. Prepare the General Budget of the Republic and promul-
gate it upon approval or review by the National Assem-
bly, depending on the case;
6. Appoint and remove Ministers and Vice Ministers of
State, Delegate Ministers of the Presidency, Presidents or
Directors of autonomous and governmental institutions
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and other officials whose appointment or removal is not
otherwise determined in the Constitution and the laws;
7. Assume the legislative faculties delegated by the National
Assembly during its recess period;
8. Conduct the international relations of the Republic, for-
malize international treaties, agreements or accords and
appoint the heads of diplomatic missions;
9. Decree and put into effect the State of Emergency in cir-
cumstances defined by this Political Constitution and for-
ward the decree to the National Assembly for ratification
within a period of no more than forty-five days;
10. Adopt regulations to give effect to the laws;
11. Grant honorary orders and decorations of a national
character;
12. Organize and conduct the government and preside over
Cabinet meetings;
13. Administer the economy of the country and determine
socio-economic policies and programs;
14. Propose slates of three candidates to the National Assem-
bly for the election of Judges to the Supreme Court of
Justice, Members to the Supreme Electoral Council and
the Controller General of the Republic;
15. Present the annual report and other reports and special
messages to the National Assembly personally or via the
Vice President;
16. Fulfill the other functions conferred by this Constitution
and the laws.
Art.151 The President of the Republic determines the number, organi-
zation and jurisdiction of the government ministries and au-
tonomous and state institutions. The ministers, vice ministers
and presidents or directors of autonomous and governmental
institutions enjoy immunity.
Art. 152 Ministers, vice ministers or presidents of autonomous or gov-
ernmental institutions must be:
1. A Nicaraguan national;
2. In full enjoyment of political and civil rights;
3. Over twenty-five years of age.
Art. 153 Ministers, vice ministers and presidents or directors of autono-
mous and governmental institutions are responsible for their
acts in conformity with this Constitution and the laws.
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CHAPTER IV
OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE REPUBLIC
Art. 154 The Office of the Controller General of the Republic is the
governing body which controls public administration and the
"Area of People's Property" (public property).
Art.155 The Controller General of the Republic has the following
responsibilities:
1. The establishment of a system which controls the proper
use and prevents abuses of funds;
2. Ongoing supervision of the management of the General
Budget of the Republic;
3. Control, examination and evaluation of the administrative
and financial management of public institutions, those sub-
sidized by the state and the public or private enterprises
which receive investments of public capital.
Art. 156 The Office of the Controller General of the Republic shall en-
joy functional and administrative autonomy and shall be di-
rected by the Controller General of the Republic, who shall
give annual reports to the National Assembly and enjoy
immunity.
Art.157 The law shall determine the organization and functioning of
the Office of the Controller General of the Republic.
CHAPTER V
JUDICIAL BRANCH
Art. 158 Justice emanates from the people and shall be carried out in
their name as their proxy by the Judicial Branch, composed of
the Courts of Justice established by law.
Art.159 The Courts of Justice form a single system, headed by the
Supreme Court of Justice.
The exercise of judicial powers falls under the authority of the
Judicial Branch. Military jurisdiction is established, and its
exercise is regulated by law.
Art. 160 The administration of justice guarantees the principle of legal-
ity and protects and promotes human rights through the appli-
cation of law in the matters within its ju:risdiction.
Art.161 A Judge of the Supreme Court of Justice must be:
1. A Nicaraguan national;
2. A lawyer;
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3. In full enjoyment of political and civil rights;
4. Over twenty-five years of age.
Art.162 Judges shall serve for a term of six years and may be dismissed
from their position only for reasons determined by law.
Judges enjoy immunity.
Art.163 The Supreme Court of Justice shall be composed of at least
seven Judges, selected by the National Assembly, from slates
of three candidates proposed by the President of the Republic.
The Judges shall take office after being sworn in before the Na-
tional Assembly.
The President of the Supreme Court of Justice shall be ap-
pointed by the President of the Republic from among the
Judges selected by the National Assembly.
Art.164 The functions of the Supreme Court of Justice are to:
1. Organize and direct the administration of justice;
2. Review and decide ordinary and extraordinary appeals
presented against the judgments of the Courts of Justice of
the Republic, in accord with the proceedings established
by law;
3. Review and decide on writs of amparo claiming violations
of rights established in the Constitution, according to the
Law of Amparo;
4. Review and decide on writs challenging the constitutional-
ity of a law, filed in conformity with the Constitution and
the Law of Amparo;
5. Appoint the Judges of the Appeals Courts and the Courts
of the Republic, in accord with the procedures established
by law;
6. Draft its internal rules and appoint its personnel;
7. Fulfill other functions conferred on it by the Constitution
and the laws.
Art.165 In their judicial activity Supreme Court Judges and other
Judges are independent and are subject only to the Constitu-
tion and the law; they shall be governed by, among others, the
principles of equality, public proceedings and the right to a de-
fense. In Nicaragua justice is free of charge.
Art.166 The administration ofjustice shall be organized and shall func-
tion with popular participation as determined by the law. The
members of the Courts of Justice, be they lawyers or not, have
equal authority in the exercise of their legal functions.
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Art. 167 State authorities, organizations and legal institutions and indi-
viduals must comply with the verdicts and resolutions of the
Courts and Judges.
CHAPTER VI
ELECTORAL BRANCH
Art. 168 The organization, management and oversight of elections,
plebiscites and referendums are the exclusive responsibility of
the Electoral Branch.
Art. 169 The Electoral Branch is composed of the Supreme Electoral
Council and other, subordinate electoral bodies.
Art. 170 The Supreme Electoral Council is composed of five Members
with their respective Alternates, elected by the National As-
sembly from slates of three candidates for each position pro-
posed by the President of the Republic. The National
Assembly shall select the President of the Supreme Electoral
Council from the elected Members.
Art.171 The Judges of the Supreme Electoral Council must be:
1. Nicaraguan nationals;
2. In full enjoyment of political and civil rights;
3. Over twenty-five years of age.
Art. 172 The President and other Members of the Supreme Electoral
Council shall exercise their functions for a term of six years
starting from the date on which they take office; during this
period they enjoy immunity.
Art. 173 The functions of the Supreme Electoral Council are to:
1. Organize and conduct the elections, plebiscites or refer-
endums convoked in accordance with the Constitution
and the law;
2. Appoint the members of the other electoral bodies, in ac-
cordance with the Electoral Law;
3. Establish the calendar for elections;
4. Apply the constitutional and legal provisions that refer to
the electoral process;
5. Serve as the final arbiter of resolutions enacted by
subordinate electoral bodies and of the claims and dis-
putes presented by political parties;
6. Issue relevant measures in accordance with the law to en-
sure that the electoral process develops under conditions
of full legal guarantees;
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7. Ensure that the appropriate bodies provide security for
the political parties participating in the elections;
8. Make the final check of the votes cast in the elections,
plebiscites and referendums, and present the final decla-
ration of the results;
9. Draft its own regulations;
10. Fulfill other functions conferred on it by the Constitution
and the laws.
Art. 174 The Members and Alternates of the Supreme Electoral Coun-
cil shall take office after being sworn in by the President of the
National Assembly.
TITLE IX
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
CHAPTER I
MUNICIPALITIES
Art. 175 The national territory shall be divided for administrative pur-
poses into Regions, Departments and Municipalities. The laws
regarding this matter shall determine the size, number, organi-
zation, structure and operation of the various districts.
Art.176 The Municipality is the basic unit of political administration in
the country. The law shall determine their number and size.
Art.177 The government and administration of municipalities is the re-
sponsibility of the municipal authorities, who enjoy autonomy
without abrogating the authority of the central government.
Municipal governments shall be elected by the people, through
equal, direct, free and universal suffrage in secret ballot, in
conformity with the law.
Art. 178 Municipal authorities shall serve six-year terms, beginning
from the day they are sworn in before the Supreme Electoral
Council.
Art.179 The state shall promote the integral and harmonious develop-
ment of the diverse parts of the nation.
CHAPTER II
COMMUNITIES OF THE ATLANTIC COAST
Art.180 The Communities of the Atlantic Coast have the right to live
and develop under the forms of social organization that corre-
spond to their historic and cultural traditions. The state guar-
antees these communities the benefits of their natural
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resources, the legitimacy of their forms of communal property
and the free election of their authorities and representatives.
Furthermore, it guarantees the preservation of their cultures
and languages, religion and customs.
Art. 181 The state shall implement a law which establishes autonomous
governments in the regions inhabited by the Communities of
the Atlantic Coast to guarantee the exercise of their rights.
TITLE X
SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION, ITS
REFORM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAWS
CHAPTER I
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
Art.182 The Political Constitution is the fundamental charter of the
Republic; all other laws are subordinate to it. Any laws, trea-
ties, orders or provisions that oppose it or alter its provisions
shall be null and void.
Art.183 No branch of government, governmental body or official shall
have any authority, faculty or jurisdiction other than those
conferred by the Political Constitution and the laws of the
Republic.
Art.184 Once written, the Electoral Law, Emergency Law and Law of
Amparo will have constitutional status under the Political
Constitution of Nicaragua.
Art.185 The President of the Republic may suspend the rights and
guarantees consecrated in this Constitution within part or all
of the nation in case of war or when demanded by national
security, economic conditions or a national catastrophe.
The President's decree shall put the State of Emergency into
effect for a specified renewable time period. The Law of Emer-
gency shall regulate its forms. During a State of Emergency,
the President of the Republic is authorized to approve the
General Budget of the Republic and forward it to the National
Assembly for its review.
Art.186 The President of the Republic can not suspend the rights and
guarantees established in articles 23; 24; 25, no.3; 26, no.3; 27;
29; 33, nos. 2.1 (final part), 3 and 5; 34, except nos. 2 and 8; 35;
36; 37; 38; 39; 40; 41; 42; 43; 44; 46; 47; 48; 50; 51; 56; 57; 58;
59; 60; 61; 62; 63; 64; 65; 67, first paragraph; 68, first para-
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graph; 69; 70; 71; 72; 73; 74; 75; 76; 77; 78; 79; 80; 81; 82; 84;
85; 87; 89; 90 and 91.
CHAPTER II
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL
Art.187 Any citizen has the right to seek judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of any law, decree or regulation that is inconsistent
with the Political Constitution.
Art.188 The Writ of Amparo may be used to challenge any provision,
act or resolution and any action or omission of any official or
authority or his or her agent violating or attempting to violate
the rights and guarantees affirmed in the Political Constitution.
Art.189 The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be used by anyone whose
freedom, physical integrity or security is violated or is in dan-
ger of being violated.
Art.190 The Law of Amparo shall regulate the remedies established in
this chapter.
CHAPTER II
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Art.191 The National Assembly is empowered to partially amend this
Political Constitution and to review and approve its total
revision.
The President of the Republic or one-third of the Representa-
tives to the National Assembly can initiate a partial reform.
Half of the total number of Representatives to the National
Assembly plus one are necessary to initiate a total reform.
Art.192 A proposal for partial reform must specify the article or arti-
cles to be reformed with a statement of the reasons for the
modification. The proposal must be sent to a special commis-
sion which shall render an opinion within no more than 60
days; the initiative shall then follow the same process as for the
creation of a law.
A proposal for partial reform must be discussed in two sessions
of the National Assembly.
Art. 193 A proposal for total reform shall follow the same process as in
the previous article, except that upon its approval, the Na-
tional Assembly shall establish a time period for holding elec-
tions for a Constituent National Assembly. The National
19881
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
Assembly shall retain jurisdiction until the installation of the
new Constituent National Assembly.
Until a new Constitution has been approved by the Constituent
National Assembly, this Constitution shall remain in effect.
Art. 194 Approval of a partial reform shall require a favorable vote by
sixty percent of the Representatives. Two-thirds of the total
number of Representatives are required to approve a total revi-
sion. The President of the Republic must promulgate the par-
tial amendment, which is not subject to veto.
Art.195 The reform of constitutional laws shall follow the procedure
established for partial reform of the Constitution, with the ex-
ception of the requirement of discussion in two legislative
sessions.
TITLE XI
FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Art.196 This Constitution shall govern from the time of its publication
in La Gaceta, the official daily legal publication, and shall an-
nul the Fundamental Statute of the Republic, the Statute of
Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans and all other legal pro-
visions inconsistent with it.
Art.197 This Constitution shall be widely disseminated in the official
language of the country. It shall also be disseminated in the
languages of the Communities of the Atlantic Coast.
Art. 198 All aspects of the existing legal order that do not contradict
this Constitution shall remain in effect, until such time as they
may be modified.
Art. 199 The Special Courts shall continue to function until such time
as they come under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch.
The appointment of their members and their procedures shall
be determined by the laws that established them.
Furthermore, the Common Courts shall continue to function
in their present form, until a system with popular representa-
tion is established. This principle shall be implemented gradu-
ally in accord with the circumstances.
Art.200 The current political administrative division shall be preserved
until the law governing it is promulgated.
Art.201 The President and Vice President of the Republic and the Rep-
resentatives to the National Assembly, elected November 4,
1984, shall exercise their functions during the term that ends
January 10 and 9, 1991, respectively.
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The members of the Supreme Court of Justice and the
Supreme Electoral Council and other authorities and officials
of the diverse branches of government shall continue to exer-
cise their functions until such time as their successors take of-
fice in accordance with the Constitution.
Art.202 Four official copies of this Constitution shall be signed by the
President and Representatives to the National Assembly and
by the President of the Republic. These copies shall be kept in
the offices of the Presidency of the National Assembly, the
Presidency of the Republic, the Presidency of the Supreme
Court of Justice and the Presidency of the Supreme Electoral
Council. Each one shall have the force of the authentic text of
the Political Constitution of Nicaragua. The President of the
Republic shall cause it to be published in La Gaceta, the offi-
cial daily publication.
GIVEN IN THE MEETING HALL OF THE NATIONAL ASSEM-
BLY, IN THE CITY OF MANAGUA, NOVEMBER 19, 1986.
"FOR 25 YEARS, ALL ARMS AGAINST THE AGGRESSION"
EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
CARLOS NUNEZ TELLEZ
PRESIDENT
LETICIA HERRERA
VICE PRESIDENT
RAFAEL SOLIS CERDA
SECRETARY
JUAN TIJERINO FAJARDO
SECRETARY
CARLOS MEJIA GODOY
ORLANDO PINEDA LOPEZ
IRELA PRADO BERNHEIM
ROSARIO ALTAMIRANO LOPEZ
CARLOS CENTENO GARCIA
BLAS ESPINOSA CORRALES
VICTORINO ESPINALES REYES
JULIO GUILLEN RAMOS
ALEJANDRO BRAVO SERRANO
JOSE LUIS VILLAVICENCIO 0.
RAMIRO LACAYO MONTEALEGRE
HUMBERTO SOLIS BARKER
NATHAN SEVILLA GOMEZ
MANUEL EUGARRIOS VELASQUEZ
JOSE MARIA RUIZ COLLADO
ANGELA ROSA ACEVEDO VASQUEZ
RAFAEL CHAVEZ ALVAREZ
JACINTO CHAVEZ LACAYO
MAURICIO DIAZ DAVILA
VICE PRESIDENT
DOMINGO SANCHEZ SALGADO
SECRETARY
HERIBERTO RODRIGUEZ MARIN
RAMON SANABRIA CENTENO
FILEMON HERNANDEZ MUNOZ
FRANCISCO JARQUIN RAMIREZ
ELIGIO PALACIOS MARADIAGA
EDUARDO ZAPATA ALTAMIRANO
Ma. TERESA DELGADO MARTINEZ
JUANA SANTOS ROQUE BERVIS
ONOFRE GUEVARA LOPEZ
JOSE MARIA ORTIZ CERDA
LUIS ROCHA URTECHO
AUXILIADORA MARTINEZ SUAREZ
SIXTO ULLOA DONA
DANILO AGUIRRE SOLIS
DAMASO VARGAS LOAISIGA
GUSTAVO ADOLFO VEGA VARGAS
BERTHA ROSA FLORES ZAMBRANA
ENRIQUE SANCHEZ ARANA
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L.F. ALVARO GONZALEZ FLORES
JULIO MARENCO CALDERA
WILFREDO LOPEZ PALMA
ALEJANDRO SEQUEIRA HERNANDEZ
SERAFIN GARCIA TORRES
HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ BLANDON
ALFONSO LOPEZ LOPEZ
JAIME O'NEIL PEREZ ALTAMIRANO
DOROTEA WILSON THATUM
HAZEL LAU BLANCO
GABRIEL AGUIRRE MARIN
ULISES TERAN NAVAS
RAFAEL CORDOBA ORIVAS
BLANCA BERMUDEZ COREA
JOSE DANIEL BRENES AGUILAR
ROGERS C. ARGUELLO RIVAS
CONSTANTINO PEREIRA B.
JULIO MELENDEZ HERMIDA
CARLOS ALONSO GARCIA
LUIS HUMBERTO GUZMAN AREAS
ALFREDO RODRIGUEZ SALGUERA
ALLAN ZAMBRANA SALMERON
LUIS SANCHEZ SANCHO
FRANCISCO MENA AGUIRRE
ROGELIO RAMIREZ MERCADO
YADIRA MENDOZA SARAVIA
ADRIAN RAMIREZ TELLEZ
MIGUEL GONZALEZ HERNANDEZ
ERASMO MONTOYA LEIVA
LUIS CHAVARRIA MOREIRA
ORLANDO RIZO ESPINOZA
BENIGNA MENDIOLA SEQUEIRA
RAY HOOKER TAYLOR
EDWIN ILLESCAS SALINAS
GUSTAVO MENDOZA HERNANDEZ
GERARDO ALFARO SILVA
JOSE R. QUINTANILLLA RUIZ
LUCAS URBINA DIAZ
EDUARDO CORONADO PEREZ
SANTIAGO VEGA GARCIA
MACARIO ESTRADA LOPEZ
RAMON LARIOS RUIZ
ANTONIO JARQUIN RODRIGUEZ
LEONCIO RAYO GONZALEZ
ARIEL BRAVO LORIO
THEREFORE, LET IT BE PUBLISHED.
MANAGUA, JANUARY 9, 1987.
DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
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